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The Bahamas’ economy depends primarily on tourism. Unchecked crime and 
cross-border threats jeopardize the country’s economic viability. The Bahamian 
government must find the solution for safeguarding the country’s relatively high standard 
of living. Nonetheless, no national security policy has been forthcoming for the yet-
developing small island state just fifty miles off the Florida coast. Central to a 
secure Bahamas is instituting a comprehensive national security strategy aimed 
at mitigating threats to national security. More direct involvement of the National 
Security Council (NSC) with improved civilian control and leadership will better 
coordinate national security. Such an outcome will bring focus to the unrelenting 
Haitian problem that results from illegal Haitian immigration to The Bahamas.  
This thesis examines how the NSC and its processes might optimally engage 
to realize strategic-level resolutions to the country's challenges. Both strategic 
and operational recommendations are offered to mitigate the Haitian problem. It is 
concluded that while The Bahamas has strong institutions, its hesitancy in 
developing a comprehensive and coherent national security strategy will prove 
detrimental if not remediated. Bahamian authorities will then be less reflexive 
and more assertive in seeking to reduce national security threats to the island nation. 
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National security, as defined by defense specialists, first entails defense in 
the narrowest concept—the protection of a nation’s people and territories 
from physical attack; and second, the more extensive concept of protection 
of political economic interests considered essential by those who exercise 
political power to the fundamental values and vitality of the state. 
—Waltraud Morales, 1989 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The only way to describe the current national security strategy of The Bahamas is 
“reflexive” because no strategy has ever been formally pronounced or published. 
Meanwhile, the country remains challenged by such transnational crime as human 
smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, arms trafficking, and poaching of its 
fisheries resources. To date, the country’s response to these issues might be characterized 
as unanchored in any kind of comprehensive policy or strategic framework. A national 
strategic plan, replete with diplomatic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement 
initiatives, would serve to mitigate the threats and continue to foster a social environment 
essential to the country’s economic survival.  
Geographically positioned just fifty nautical miles southeast of the United States, 
The Bahamas enjoys a thriving tourist industry. The stability of an economy underwritten 
by tourism depends on the government’s ability, through its security apparatus, to 
maintain an orderly, safe, and stable environment. More, as the Caribbean Basin forms 
the third border of the United States, the Bahama Islands sit astride the chain and serve as 
a transshipment point for illegal narcotics en route to North American markets. In 
addition, the unabated influx of economic migrants from Haiti, seeking a better life in 
The Bahamas or, eventually, in the United States, has plagued the country for years. 
There seem to be no ready solution.  
For this reason the Bahamian government recently invested some $232 million to 
upgrade the fleet of the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF). According to the 
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nation’s chief executive, Prime Minister Perry G. Christie: “In this vein, we must spare 
no effort at both the strategic and operational levels to put an end to cross-border criminal 
activities, such as illegal immigration; human trafficking; drug smuggling; and arms 
trafficking.”1 Christie’s declaration rightly avers that matériel, though essential to 
achieving national security, must be accompanied by considered policy and strategic 
solutions to obtain the desired conclusions. As such, equipping the military to fulfill its 
mandate of protecting the nation’s territorial integrity is but half of the battle. Realization 
of the whole depends on whether policy and strategy can be merged to optimize the use 
of both human and other resources.  
In general, the RBDF is mandated to protect the territorial integrity of The 
Bahamas, assist in times of disaster, help other law enforcement agencies maintain order 
in The Bahamas, and perform any other duties as may from time to time be directed by 
the Security Council.2 To carry out these functions, RBDF personnel are allowed under 
section 5 of the Defence Force Act, 1980 to enjoy the powers and immunities of customs 
officers and peace officers.3 In congruence with UNCLOS (signed by The Bahamas in 
1982), the Archipelagic Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 1993, sections 5 and 6, 
provides RBDF members enforcement powers within the exclusive economic zone, 
archipelagic waters, territorial seas, and internal waters of the archipelago to function as 
peace, customs, immigration, and fisheries officers for the purpose of boarding vessels in 
Bahamian territory.4  
                                                 
1.  Matt Maura, “PM Vows Even Greater Resolve to End Transnational Crime,” Nassau Guardian, 23 
September 2014. http://www.thenassauguardian.com/news/50471-pm-vows-even-greater-resolve. 
2. Defence Act, section 4, http://laws.bahamas.gov.bs/cms3/images/LEGISLATION/PRINCIPAL/
1979/1979-0007/DefenceAct_1.pdf.  
3.  Ibid., section 5(1). A member of the Defence Force, shall, while on duty, have, exercise and enjoy 
all the powers, authorities, privileges and immunities and perform all the responsibilities of a customs 
officer under sections 96, 97, 98, 102, 109, 126 and 138 of the Customs Management Act, and shall be 
deemed to be a customs officer for the purposes of the said sections. (2) A member of the Defence Force, 
shall, while on duty, have, exercise and enjoy all the powers, authorities, privileges and immunities of a 
peace officer under section 31 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and shall be deemed to be a peace officer for 
the purposes of the said section. 




Of note is the 1980 sinking of the HMBS Flamingo by the Cuban air force while 
enforcing Bahamian fisheries laws. The incident served to baptize the newly formed 
RBDF by fire, and to endear a sense of nationhood across the scattered islands of The 
Bahamas. Shortly after capturing two Cuban vessels engaged in fishing illegally on the 
Great Bahama Bank, the Flamingo—a 102-foot Bahamian fast-patrol craft—was fired 
upon and sunk by Cuban MIG fighters, resulting in the loss of four Bahamian seamen.5 
The Cubans, who initially claimed that the entire incident was somehow provoked by the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and that they mistook the clearly marked Bahamian 
military vessel for a pirate ship, eventually apologized and paid reparations for the loss of 
the vessel and crewmen.6  
Noticeably, Bahamian military personnel—unlike their U.S. counterparts, who are 
restrained from domestic operations by the American Posse Comitatus Act of June 
1878—are lawfully empowered to operate domestically. In reality, the RBDF, whose 
main focus from inception has been maritime border security, has traditionally exercised 
law enforcement powers. Separate from the organization’s occasional involvement with 
disaster preparedness and relief operations, its main focus is the interdiction of drug 
smugglers, poachers, and illegal migrants. Ultimately, RBDF leaders are pretty much left 
to themselves to determine how their efforts are prioritized with the exception of the 
periodic public outcry over invasive foreign fishing fleets or unwanted Haitian boat 
landings.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE 
This research seeks to determine the role of the National Security Council (NSC) 
in ensuring that it remains “Better in The Bahamas,” as touted by the country’s long-
running tourism mantra.7 Specifically, it will examine how the NSC and its process must 
lead the strategic-level resolution to national and transnational threats in The Bahamas, 
                                                 
5.  Michael Craton and Gail Saunders, Islanders in the Stream: A History of the Bahamian People 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 371. 
6.  Ibid., 371. 
7.  Official Nassau Paradise Island, Bahamas, Vacation Guide, accessed 9 November 2015, 
http://www.nassauparadiseisland.com.  
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including, perhaps most urgently, illegal immigration from Haiti. Granted the economic, 
criminal, and perhaps even terroristic threats inherent in this Haitian problem, the 
proposed project will examine ways that an improved NSC process could benefit the 
country and the region.8  
Despite the many cross-border threats faced by The Bahamas, the government in 
Nassau has never produced a national security policy demonstrating contemplation of an 
adequate response. Yet, crime associated with illegal drug trafficking, small arms 
smuggling, youth gang violence, corruption, and criminal deportees are identified by the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as the “principal threats and obstacles to the social 
and economic development” of the region.9 While Bahamian security authorities—
whether law enforcement or armed forces—have responded to these challenges as they 
arise, little sustained progress can be made to address larger, underlying conditions with 
no clear or complete strategic guidance or coordination.  
All told, The Bahamas needs an NSC that fulfills its fundamental functions of 
democratic control and effectiveness by implementing comprehensive national security 
policies capable of meeting the post-9/11 realities. Such an outcome is significant to the 
security, economic, and social well-being of the country. The NSC must produce and 
implement a broad national security plan that includes a comprehensive maritime 
arrangement, foreign relations overtures, and immigration initiatives, aimed toward 
ameliorating the Haitian immigration issue. The absence of such a plan results in the 
continuance of the status quo, in which Bahamian and American citizens are forced to 
abide both the costs and potential security risks linked to uncontrolled Haitian 
immigration to their respective countries.  
                                                 
8.  Dawn Marshall, The Haitian Problem: Illegal Migration to the Bahamas (Cave Hill, Barbados: 
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1979), xiii. 
9.  CARICOM: Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community 2014–2019: Repositioning CARICOM, 
vol. 1, The Executive Plan, iii, http://caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/
EXECUTIVE%20PLAN%20VOL%201%20-%20FINAL.pdf.  
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C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Scholarship concerned with developing policy-making structures that include the 
necessary oversight of the security apparatus, among other things, is sorely wanting. 
Scholars of civil-military relations (CMR) readily appreciate that earlier works on the 
subject did little to address the “wider problem of democratic management and 
implementation of defense and security policy.”10 Nonetheless, experts have determined 
the need for developing countries, to which category The Bahamas is designated due to 
its specific “social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities,”11 to cultivate a robust 
CMR component in their effort to achieve comprehensive national security goals and 
objectives. CMR proponents recognize that CMR is established and propagated through 
“training and engaging government officials in an informed, active, and continuing 
dialogue with military officers.”12 Further, it is also known that in countries such as The 
Bahamas where NSCs actually exist, the NSCs have no active part in policy making and 
take no active part in national security.  
In The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington’s normative outlook stressed 
the notion that the military is shaped by both “a functional imperative stemming from 
threats to society’s security and societal imperative arising from the social forces, 
ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.”13 He recognized society’s need 
for protection and the inherent tensions existing between political and military leaders.  
Trying to establish balance between a powerful military and its civilian leadership 
following World War II, Huntington submitted that “objective civilian control” of the 
military might achieve the desired equilibrium for CMR while enhancing national 
security, as it allows military professionals the freedom to demonstrate competence 
                                                 
10.  Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic: 
Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 (2002): 32. 
11.  European Union, Islands, Country Vulnerability, and Resistance Profile, accessed 9 November 
2015, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5229260attrdlu7.pdf.  
12.  Johanna Mendelson Forman and Claude Welch, “Civil-Military Relations: USAID’s Role,” 
Washington, DC: USAID Center for Democracy and Governance, 1998, 8, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
pnacc887.pdf.  
13.  Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Harvard University Press, 1957), 219–220. 
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unhindered by political elites.14 Objective civilian control, then, might be described as a 
successful means by which political leaders ensure the political neutrality of the military, 
while simultaneously improving the national security platform. As a result, political 
control is maintained without military interference.  
On the other hand, Huntington argued that “subjective civilian control,” in 
opposition to objective civilian control, caused friction between military and civilian 
leaders because it sought expansion of the civilian power through reduction of military 
influence.15 While Huntington’s perspective on objective and subjective control of 
professional military institutions is useful, it fails to address the issue of maintaining 
military effectiveness in varying situations. Ultimately, though, even Huntington 
recognized that advancing national security necessitated civilian control of the military.16  
After Huntington, scholars of CMR took two distinctive paths, which included the 
study of military sociology and institutions of CMR in developing countries.17 In The 
Professional Soldier, Morris Janowitz concludes that military professionalism is the 
linchpin to civilian control. He cautioned, however, that overreliance on “the creation of 
an apolitical military in order to ensure civilian control” was impractical.18  
Accepting that the monitoring of military behavior is a civilian prerogative, 
Feaver suggests that the question of how civilians monitor such behavior has normative 
underpinnings. He asserts that this normative framework encouraged Huntington’s 
endearment of “the Clausewitzean distinction: civilians handle policy (politics), the 
military handles operations.”19 He concludes that the government, then, is the legitimate 
arbiter of when force is to be employed, while the military is the approved agent of its 
application. Feaver’s work credibly builds on the foundational work of Huntington and 
                                                 
14.  Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80.  
15.  Ibid., 81. 
16.  Ibid., 8. 
17.  Cottey et al., “The Second Generation Problematic,” 32–35. 
18.  Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness,” Public 
Administration and Public Policy 10, no. 2, 61–84, 66.  
19.  Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 99. 
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others through its formulation, as it “helpfully puts both effectiveness and control at the 
center of civil-military relations research agenda.”20  
Rebecca Schiff’s “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concord” 
contends that “the military, the political elites, and the citizenry” ought to establish a 
cooperative relationship with less emphasis on separation.21 Apart from suggesting the 
presence of a harmonious existence between civilian leadership and the military under 
certain conditions, Schiff’s concordance theory introduces the necessity for a tripartite 
relationship for CMR to function optimally. Concordance theory emphasizes “dialogue, 
accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, 
and society” while stressing “discussion, accommodation, and shared values” among 
society’s partners.22  
Further theoretical progression in CMR is provided in “The Second Generation 
Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations,” in which the authors 
shifted “focus away from the control of the military in domestic politics and toward the 
wider problem of democratic management and implementation of defense and security 
policy.”23 Among other things, the authors argue that it was necessary to broaden the 
debate on CMR beyond its fixation with praetorianism to include actually governing the 
affairs of the security sector. The authors’ “second generation” reform of CMR focused 
on “issues of state capacity; that is the ability of democratic state structures to provide 
effective management of the armed forces and defense policy.”24  
Even more, in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, Thomas 
Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei examined the effectiveness of CMR among selected 
countries with a view to possible improvements of control, effectiveness, and efficiency 
in CMR. Their research highlighted the lacunae in the field created by Huntington’s 
                                                 
20.  Nielsen, “Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness,” 61–84, 78. 
21.  Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed 
Forces & Society 22, no. 1 (fall 1995): 7–24, http://afs.sagepub.com/content/22/1/7.  
22.  Rebecca L. Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2008), 43. 
23.  Cottey et al., “The Second Generation Problematic,” 32. 
24.  Ibid., 40. 
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inchoative work and sought to build on the tripartite framework as a result of research 
grounded in dialogue with CMR scholars and practitioners.25 They concluded that CMR 
must be a dynamic aspect of democracy in both developing and older democracies.26  
To clarify the role of democratic institutions as determinants of social and 
political outcomes, Thomas Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson build on Max Weber’s 
theory of new institutionalism. They assert that an appreciation of the roles of 
institutions, inclusive of “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and 
conventions,” is vital to an appreciation of how society manages power.27 This 
understanding forces attention on institutions, such as “ministries of defense, legislatures, 
the military as a profession, control of military budgets, the means by which intelligence 
is gathered and applied, military education, and the recruitment system,” that control 
CMR.28 New Institutionalism, according to CMR specialists Bruneau and Tollefson, 
“directs our attention to the centrality of institutions in structuring relations of power, 
through the conditions of their creation, the interests of those involved in creating them, 
and the influence of pre-existing institutional models” and merges to cover the issues of 
civilian leadership of the military.29  
Moving beyond traditional CMR dispositions, Bruneau and Tollefson offer three 
elements vital to political governance of the security sector: a functioning administration, 
oversight, and an involved civil society.30 Appreciating the diversity among states and 
types of administrative regimes, concordance theory succeeds in finding relevance in 
both transitioning democracies and established democracies. Intellectuals in the field, 
however, acknowledge the many challenges associated with the development of defense 
                                                 
25.  Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1. 
26.  Ibid., 3. 
27.  Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2009), 153. 
28.  Ibid., 6.  
29.  Ibid., 7. 
30.  Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered,” 13. 
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and national security policy. Ultimately, though, actual policy making demands 
determinations that match available resources if the desired outcome is to be realized.31  
In The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, Narcis Serra 
recounts the process of developing and implementing policy in Spain during their 
transition to democracy. The statesman and scholar explicate a model fit for replication 
by others crafting military policy. According to Serra, military reform policy must be 
inclusive of overall governmental reform. In the case of Spain, overall integration of 
military and national policy included the appointments of military commanders to key 
political positions and the enactment of laws that served to synchronize efforts in 
“defence, foreign and general government policies.”32 Serra also emphasized the 
importance of the role to be played by the minister of defence in the conduct of CMR. 
The minister, says Serra, “must be very clear that the fundamental issue at stake in 
civilian-military relations is power and that as minister he must hold the reins in terms of 
power.”33  
In “National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-
Military Relations,” Thomas Bruneau, et al., examined how an adequately functioning 
NSC “enhances civilian control” and enables “the effective implementation of roles and 
missions.”34 Their research scrutinized NSCs, in whatever iteration identified, of eight 
countries and found very little harmony of practice among them. The authors discovered 
that the existence of an NSC implied “neither democratic civilian control nor effective 
strategy formulation or coordination.35  
Furthermore, the researchers discovered that the few NSCs in existence have very 
little involvement in their respective countries’ “national security and defence, or in 
                                                 
31.  Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians, 112–13. 
32.  Narcís Serra and Peter Bush, The Military Transition: Democratic Transform of the Armed Forces 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69. 
33.  Ibid., 81. 
34.  Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Sak Sakoda, “National Security Councils: Their 
Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Defense & Security Analysis 25, no. 3 (2009): 
256. 
35.  Ibid., 257. 
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democratic civil-relations.” This reality pertained even to the United States, whose NSC 
was set-up in 1947 by the U.S. Congress. Even so, scholars concerned with reform of the 
security sector resolved that across the world, governments desired “democratic control, 
effectiveness, and efficiency” in their security forces.36  
The researchers determined that an optimally functioning NSC fulfilled a 
minimum of seven main roles. These include: (1) guiding the chief executive on matters 
of national security; (2) coordinating national security agencies to consensus and policy 
enactment; (3) communicating policies to legislators; (4) filtering intelligence for 
policymakers; (5) composing national security strategies; (6) ensuring teamwork and 
application of strategies among operators; and (7) synchronizing foreign relations and 
national security exertions.37 Undoubtedly, this study memorializes the importance of a 
functioning NSC toward maximizing civilian control of the national security apparatus. 
In summary, CMR is a vital aspect of democracy that involves the participation of 
the whole of society, including the political elites, military professionals, and the civilian 
population. It cuts across all sizes and manner of states in pursuance of security while 
maintaining harmony between the purveyors of power and the instruments used to 
achieve it. The formative works of Huntington, Janowitz, Feaver, and others laid a firm 
foundation upon which second generation scholars such as Schiff, Bruneau, and their 
contemporaries continue to build a more effective framework for achieving the desired 
outcome of an optimally functioning CMR paradigm.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESES  
The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, like other former British colonies, inherited 
strong institutions upon independence. In the post-colonial era, however, The Bahamas 
has struggled to develop a national security organization apt to the tasks of expertly 
fending off threats to its national security.  
                                                 
36.  Bruneau et al., “National Security Councils,” 256. 
37.  Ibid., 257–58. 
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Scholars suggest that “successful policy and strategy are only possible if those 
who are in power, the national security professionals, who support them, the national 
media, who over watch them, and an informed public prepare themselves to 
participate.”38 Hence, political efforts to secure Bahamian borders will not materialize 
until all of the stakeholders produce and embrace a comprehensive plan managed by 
civilian and military leadership. Until, a workable national security and defense strategy 
is produced and implemented, policy aspirations are likely to remain elusive.  
Military acquiescence to civilian leadership is a prominent feature of democracy. 
Methods of implementing and maintaining civilian control of the military remains, 
however, a knotty problem in both seasoned and still-developing democratic regimes. 
Even in the face of increased demands for more nimble military institutions capable of 
opposing evolving threats, too many countries have no national security blueprint. 
Numerous governments manifest a particular aversion to creating holistic defense and 
security policies. Specialists suggest that part of the reason for this inertia, as 
demonstrated by Latin American politicians in this regard, is their desire to maintain a 
harmonious coexistence with the military establishment. Caribbean leaders also 
undoubtedly consider the possible negative effects of a disgruntled military. Yet, they 
may find solace in the notion that historically the U.S. government has responded 
relatively promptly to quell military misbehavior in the Caribbean region. Caribbean 
countries, then, present an entirely different paradigm relative to military control as 
evinced in countries like Brazil and Argentina whose central aim is controlling the 
military.  
In any event, politicians in developing countries must recognize that CMR with 
security is among the more basic prerequisites for enhancement. In this study, it is 
hypothesized that a more deliberately engaged NSC will improve The Bahamas’ ability 
to more capably address its national security and defense challenges.  
                                                 
38.  Harry Richard Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and 
Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 3.  
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis explicates progressive CMR initiatives aimed at effective NSC 
functions, such as the creation, promulgation, and implementation of a comprehensive 
national security policy to meet the challenges that the country faces. An analysis of best 
and worst practices, as evinced by the United State is examined to determine the best way 
forward for implementation on a smaller scale in the Bahamian framework. 
As the principal aim of this study is to ascertain whether the national security 
challenges confronting The Bahamas might be mitigated by enhanced CMR, it is 
necessary to conduct an analysis of the literature relative to the influence of CMR on 
leveraging better national security outcomes. The indispensable building blocks of 
effective CMR are “democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency.”39 Scholars 
conclude that the NSCs of few nations fulfill all of the “fundamental functions of 
democratic control and effectives.”40 In the end, this thesis will explain how 
implementation of CMR best practices can mitigate the national security challenges of 
The Bahamas.  
F. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The second chapter of this thesis reveals Bahamian national insecurity since the 
islands’ discovery in 1492. It traces historical maritime challenges to Bahamian national 
security from pre-independence, post-independence, to present and exposes that 
opportunistic maritime criminality has historically been part of the Bahamian experience. 
This section also expounds on how issues will diminish the country’s relatively 
prosperous economic outlook if left unchecked. 
Chapter III discusses the current structures and processes of The Bahamas’ 
national security paradigm by explaining the functions of the NSC, the Ministry of 
National Security, the RBDF and others. This chapter also observes that the present 
national security regime of The Bahamas might be improved through deliberate CMR 
                                                 
39.  Bruneau et al., “National Security Councils,” 256.  
40.  Ibid., 255. 
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initiatives and applications focused on enhanced civilian involvement. It holds that the 
mounting security challenges faced by the country will only be effectively managed 
through a properly functioning NSC, which articulates a holistic national security strategy 
aimed toward systematic and comprehensive initiatives in response to domestic and 
transnational threats to the nation. 
Chapter IV explains what is known in The Bahamas as the Haitian problem. It 
traces the historical yet contemporary roots of the problem fueled by Bahamians, 
migrants, and their governments, which has now manifested social, security, and other 
concerns in The Bahamas. Apart from examining the socioeconomic challenges of Haiti, 
which fuels the problem, this section also reveals the inefficacy of the perennial 
Bahamian policy of apprehend, detain, and repatriate employed by successive Bahamian 
administrations for more than fifty years. It proffers the urgent need for a comprehensive 
national security strategy that is aimed toward mitigating illegal immigration from 
Haitian and seeks to secure Bahamian borders and save Haitian lives that are frequently 
lost on the dangerous journey to The Bahamas and elsewhere.  
The final chapter of this thesis offers conclusions and recommendations for 
bringing the Haitian problem under control before it results in civil unrest as evidenced 
by growing national anti-Haitian sentiments throughout The Bahamas. This chapter 
demonstrates that a properly functioning NSC, possessed of a holistic, coherent, and 
manageable national security strategy, can improve the future economic and social future 
of The Bahamas by bringing more acute focus to the Haitian issue at home and in Haiti. 
As a result, the Bahamian-Haitian illegal immigration problem might be mitigated and 
Haitian lives saved.  
 14 
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II. PERENNIAL MARITIME CHALLENGES 
Expulsis Pirates—Restituta Commercia41 
 
When Christopher Columbus first made landfall in the Americas in 1492—on the 
Bahamian island of San Salvador—The Bahamas literally became the gateway to the 
New World.42 Since then, the archipelago’s more than seven hundred islands, rocks, and 
cays have been generally exploited by many seeking, as did Spain with Columbus, riches 
through unfettered abuse of the country’s maritime domain.  
Expatriate settlers of the islands, and later, Bahamians and others, have 
historically sought opportunistic fortune by embracing nefarious maritime activities in the 
islands. Pirates, rum runners, drug smugglers, and others long operated with relative 
impunity in the waters of The Bahamas. 
These problems persist today, despite the best efforts over the years by U.S. and 
Bahamian authorities to eradicate the unlawful enterprise—perhaps in part because of the 
well-established legacy of such maritime lawlessness. This chapter touches on the main 
pre- and post-independence challenges in U.S.–Bahamian relations, as well as current 
maritime threats faced by the country, which have much to do with this legacy. It pays 
particular attention to the nation’s checkered past of illegal maritime activity, a continuity 
that today threatens to cast a pall of insecurity on that George Washington once described 
as the “Isles of Perpetual June.”43  
                                                 
41.  Due to the effective methods employed by Captain Woodes Rodgers—first royal governor of the 
Bahamian Islands—to rid the islands of marauding pirates in 1718, the colony was able to ascribe the motto 
“Expulsis pirates, restituta commercia,” which means “pirates repulsed, commerce restored.” See “History 
of The Bahamas,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com/place/The-Bahamas.  
42.  David Russell Harris, “The Bahamas: Islands, West Indies,” in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 
accessed 15 July 2015, http://www.britannica.com/place/The-Bahamas.  
43.  John O. Williams, “Rodent Problems of the West Indies,” in Proceedings of the Twelfth 
Vertebrate Pest Conference (Paper 62, 1986), 184. 
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A. MARITIME LAWLESSNESS UNDER COLONIAL RULE 
Even though the islands of The Bahamas had been under British rule since 1670, 
“they were at the mercy of the wild, lawless brigands who pirated the area.”44 Raiding 
pirates like Charles Vane, Mary Reed, Anne Bonny, and Edward Teach—more widely 
known as Blackbeard—represented the foremost danger posed to the stability of the 
colony in its inchoative years.45 These violent men and women in search of booty 
unleashed unprecedented levels of lawlessness in Bahamian waters during their 
ascendance at the turn of the eighteenth century.  
On the other hand, the proliferation of piracy in The Bahamas and in other 
Caribbean territories governed by the English realm was nothing short of peculiar, 
especially since Henry VIII had created a law to deal with pirates in 1536.46 King 
Henry’s Offences at Sea Act supposedly signaled England’s sovereign intent to eradicate 
piracy wherever it might be found within the Crown’s remit.47 Yet by 1563, determined 
to share in the windfall of gold being extracted from the Americas by Spain, Queen 
Elizabeth I effectively legitimized piracy by sanctioning privateers to intercept Spanish 
galleons by force for their precious cargo.48  
Through the 1570s, even though English and Spanish relationships were restored, 
English pirates and adventurers continued to subvert Spanish hegemony region while 
Queen Elizabeth turned a blind eye.49 Over decades, buccaneers raided “Spanish coastal 
towns and, to a lesser degree, shipping while using the colonial ports” of England and 
others “as safe havens.”50 British seaborne brigands enjoyed such a free run in the islands 
                                                 
44.  Sylvia Perfetti Dupuch, “Pirates: Opting for a Short but Merry Life,” in Bahamas Handbook and 
Businessman’s Annual (Dupuch Publication, 2014), 85.  
45.  Ibid., 81.  
46.  Arne Bialuschewski, “Pirates, Markets and Imperial Authority: Economic Aspects of Maritime 
Depredations in the Atlantic World, 1716–1726,” Global Crime, 9, no:1–2 (2008), 52, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/17440570701862769.  
47.  Ibid., 53. 
48.  Jon Latimer, Buccaneers of the Caribbean: How Piracy Forged an Empire (Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 13. 
49.  Ibid., 14. 
50.  Bialuschewski, “Pirates, Markets and Imperial Authority,” 53.  
 17 
of The Bahamas that it was widely reported that these pirates dreamed not of going to 
heaven after death, but of returning to New Providence.51  
In 1670, the Crown conveyed the islands to “Lords Proprietors of the Province of 
Carolina,” whose objective was to establish a commercially viable colony.52 Respect for 
law and order, however, had so deteriorated in the colony by the early 1700s that pirate 
Captain Vane openly snubbed the Crown by declaring himself governor of the territory.53 
It was not until pirate activities began to threaten British commerce that the Crown was 
bestirred, half a century later, to commission a royal governor with the mandate to restore 
order by any means necessary.54 Woodes Rodgers took his office seriously and moved 
judiciously to eradicate the unwanted mariners from the area.55 Backed by nearly two 
thousand trained British soldiers, Rogers effected the surrender and royal pardon of some 
1,000 pirates and summarily hanged those who refused his truce.56 By Crown 
Proclamation in 1729, Rodgers established a representative assembly in an effort to 
maintain order on the islands.57 Rodgers’ administration managed to check piracy, but his 
islands still struggled with criminal elements. To “enforce the laws and keep the peace 
without having to resort to either the garrison or the militia,” a police force was created in 
1789.58 With few options for livelihood, though, the country continued to exploit its 
strategic layout.59 
The American Civil War (1861–1865) ushered in another period of 
geographically based—and basically nefarious—economic opportunity for The Bahamas, 
which readily accommodated Confederate blockade runners seeking to resupply Southern 
                                                 
51.  Dupuch, “Pirates: Opting for a Short but Merry Life,” 81.  
52.  Patricia Beardsley Roker, “Nassau’s Historic Government Buildings,” in Bahamas Handbook and 
Businessman’s Annual (Dupuch Publication, 2014), 127.  
53.  Dupuch, “Pirates: Opting for a Short but Merry Life,” 81.  
54.  Harris, “The Bahamas,” 2. 
55.  Dupuch, “Pirates: Opting for a Short but Merry Life,” 81.  
56.  Harris, “The Bahamas,” 2. 
57.  Ibid., 2. 
58.  Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 20. 
59.  Barbara J. Nowak, “Keeping It Better in the Bahamas: A Nation’s Socioeconomic Response to 
Juvenile Crime,” Journal of Black Studies 31, no. 4 (March 2001), 484. 
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ports in Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington.60 Trade value in Nassau rose from just 
under £400,000 to more than £10,000,000 by 1864, a mere three years into the war.61 It 
was not until Southern states fell to Union forces that blockade running ceased in the 
islands.62 The islands experienced a severe economic depression at the end of the 
American Civil War.63  
Islanders then turned their attention to the wrecking or salvage industry, a more or 
less natural business amid the many treacherous reefs in the waters of The Bahamas, 
particularly in an age of imprecise, insufficient, or unavailable navigation aids. Salvage 
itself is a legitimate maritime business, but it took on a Bahamian twist. It was widely 
held that local mariners would extinguish lighthouses so that passing ships would run 
aground on the dangerous shoals and their cargo might be recovered and sold.64 In 1865, 
a circuit magistrate reported that the inhabitants of the islands derived their principal 
income from the wrecking system, which required immediate and urgent measures to 
prevent cargoes from theft.65 Officials eventually succeeded in discouraging illegal 
maritime industry by the late 1880s through vigorous law enforcement and 
prosecutions.66  
Prohibition in 1919 in America provided another opportunity for maritime 
lawlessness in pursuit of wealth and riches in the islands of The Bahamas.67 Reports 
indicate that a lucrative rum-running industry was established in The Bahamas to 
smuggle liquor into a thirsty United States.68 Estimates by the U.S. Department of 
                                                 
60.  Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 77. 
61.  Ibid., 77. 
62.  Ibid., 78. 
63.  Nowak, “Keeping It Better In The Bahamas,” 484. 
64.  Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 142. 
65.  Ibid., 142. 
66.  Ibid., 142. 
67.  U.S. Constitution, Amendment XVIII, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxviii.  
68.  Nicholas A. Snow, “Rum Row and the Plunder Problem,” Working paper (George Mason 
University, 2011), 17, http://nicholasasnow.com/Site/Research_files/
Rum%20Row%20and%20the%20Plunder%20Problem%20101511.pdf.  
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Commerce concluded that rum traders racked up approximately $40,000,000 in 1924.69 
The Bahamian islands of Nassau and Bimini experienced a tremendous boom due to the 
rum trade.70 In the end, “the Prohibition era (1919–1933) had given Bahamians the 
opportunity profitability to smuggle alcohol into the United States.”71 What is more, it 
served as the precursor to the post-independence drug trade in the archipelago.72  
The Crown mounted sporadic efforts to preserve order on its seas by means of the 
occasional Royal Navy patrol of the territory.73 Apart from these infrequent blue-water 
patrols, the police force conducted limited maritime law enforcement activities in Nassau 
Harbour with a launch procured in 1958.74 The single launch for maritime law 
enforcement was indicative of the laissez-faire approach taken by the British in its 
colonies. “Neglect of the sea and maritime security” was commonplace in the English-
speaking Caribbean.75 In 1964, the British government enacted the first constitution in 
The Bahamas and thereby granted the islands internal self-governance, but the Crown 
“retained control of foreign affairs, defense, and internal security.”76 Through what is 
known as “the Grey Agreement,” Sir Ralph Grey, the governor of the islands at the time, 
granted the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) unrestricted access into Bahamian waters to rescue 
or assist distressed vessels.77 This agreement formed an important building block for 
future maritime law enforcement arrangements between the countries aimed at addressing 
mutual challenges.  
                                                 
69.  Snow, “Rum Row,” 17. 
70.  Ibid., 17. 
71.  Michael Craton, Pindling: The Life and Times of Lynden Oscar Pindling, First Prime Minister of 
the Bahamas, 1930–2000 ( Macmillan Caribbean, 2002), 8. 
72.  Nassau Guardian, “Drug Trafficking via the Bahamas,” 6 September 2012, 
http://www.thenassauguardian.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33897:drug-
trafficking-via-the-bahamas&catid=48:editorial&itemid=87.  
73.  Bahamas Defence Force, “History of the RBDF,” accessed 18 July 2015, http://rbdf.gov.bs/
history/. 
74.  Ibid. 
75.  Michael A. Morris, Caribbean Maritime Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 4.  
76.  Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 337. 
77.  “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Law Enforcement,” (Nassau, 
Bahamas: 29 June 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/108940.pdf.  
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B. INDEPENDENCE AND MARITIME RESPONSIBILITIES  
Scholars maintain that “the military struggle for the state in the Algerian 
revolution” (1954–1962) stirred the prospect of decolonization elsewhere.78 That said, 
before World War II, it could be safely stated that “the sun never set on the British 
empire.”79 The Bahamas was no exception, but unlike the French, who begrudgingly 
relinquished their colonies, the British granted independence to Bahamians willingly.80 
But for minor internal opposition from the descendants of Loyalists and expatriates who 
left America during the Revolutionary War, the Commonwealth of the Bahama Islands 
quietly transitioned to self-rule on 10 July 1973.  
The government of The Bahamas soon realized that governance was an art that 
did not automatically flow with sovereignty. Even more challenging were the 
complications of an archipelagic state with an open economy.81 For the first time in their 
existence, Bahamians now had to manage their own foreign relations, especially with 
their most eminent superpower neighbor, the United States, while dealing with urgent 
matters of national security entirely under their own power. Both of these imperatives of 
independence had been formerly conducted by the Crown, inflected toward British 
interests.82 Nassau had to rethink its assumptions about its maritime security, its national 
security, and its role in the world. This meant reviewing and renegotiating, where 
necessary, agreements made between the United States and United Kingdom “with little 
or no consultation with the Bahamian government.”83  
Signaling a desire for his country to meet its international obligations, the nation’s 
first prime minister, Lynden O. Pindling, and his government joined the United Nations 
                                                 
78.  Carole Boyce Davies and Monica Jardine, “Imperial Geographies and Caribbean Nationalism: At 
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(UN) in October 1973. Pindling promised that the Commonwealth of The Bahamas 
would contribute to global efforts in support of the territorial integrity of states.84 
Bahamian representatives were able to fully participate in the “negotiations of the third 
U.N. Commission on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which started in 1973 and were 
concluded with the convention’s signing at Montego Bay, Jamaica, in December 
1982.”85  
 UNCLOS III not only qualified The Bahamas as an archipelagic state, but the 
convention exponentially increased the maritime domain of the new state, which enabled 
the literal drawing of a complete baseline around the island chain.86 Moreover, in taking 
literally the United Nation’s concept of equality of nations, The Bahamas had in 1977—
five years before the conclusion of UNCLOS III—declared a 200-mile exclusive zone in 
an effort to retain historical fishing grounds.87 This step was a bold undertaking because 
it made the country’s maritime boundaries overlap with those of the United States to the 
north, as well as with Cuba and others to the south.88 Therefore, a median line could be 
lawfully drawn between adjacent territories to delimit boundaries in accordance with 
international law. Also in anticipation of UNCLOS, the administration moved to convert 
the country’s token Police Marine Division into a respectable service capable of 
operating on both land and sea.89  
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Pindling envisioned that the nascent coast guard would tackle mounting 
challenges associated with safeguarding his nation’s territory and rescuing mariners in 
danger on the sea. The leader set forth his government’s vision for the maritime service at 
his party’s twentieth National General Convention on 28 October 1975:  
What I would like to see is a force which will not only safeguard our 
sovereignty and independence but will also rescue lives at sea; a force 
which will keep out poachers and smugglers but will man our lighthouses 
and watch our sea-lanes; a force which not only will help to keep the 
peace but will also supply food and emergency relief to an island 
community ravaged by a disastrous hurricane or take much needed 
medical services to isolated communities; a force which not only will 
exemplify discipline, but will also exemplify the same by example in our 
communities where they may help to repair schools and roads and 
drains.90 
Smuggling, poaching, and any number of other illicit maritime activities were left 
relatively unchecked during British rule of the country.91 Upon independence, Pindling 
sought to tackle the almost unrestrained access of drug traffickers, foreign fishermen, and 
illegal Haitian immigration, which was suddenly propelled into the spotlight.92 The new 
government determined to bring order to the nation’s maritime domain, but failed to do 
so convincingly due to limited resources.  
On 1 January 1976, the government instituted the Ministry of Defence, authorized 
the disbanding of the Police Marine Division, and established the RBDF.93 The Defence 
Act of 1980 aptly foreshadowed the perceived challenges. The legislation broadly 
mandated the service to defend the country, safeguard its territorial integrity, patrol its 
waters, render assistance and provide relief during times of disaster, work with other law 
enforcement agencies to maintain order, and to carry out any other duties determined by 
the Security Council.94 The prime minister hoped that his nascent RBDF could eliminate 
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the need for complete dependence on the USCG for recuing stranded boaters in 
Bahamian waters and also secure the country’s borders from unwanted incursions by 
smugglers and poachers.  
C. U.S.–BAHAMIAN RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMATIC 
As illustrated during America’s revolutionary and civil wars, subversive use of 
Bahamian waters can negatively impact American security initiatives.95 U.S. long-range 
missile facilities on the Bahamian islands of Grand Bahama, Eleuthera, San Salvador, 
and Mayaguana, established during British rule of the islands, further entrenched the 
U.S.–Bahamian security nexus.96 Bahamian independence necessitated an acute 
appreciation by both Bahamian and American leaders of their symbiotic existence forced 
by geography. Only through cooperation could the two countries achieve the desired 
outcomes relative to the tough mutual security challenges they faced.97  
Amid allegations of “high-level drug-related corruption” in the Bahamian 
government, U.S.–Bahamian relations fell into disrepair in the early 1980s.98 In an effort 
to reclaim its international reputation, the government in Nassau conducted a public 
inquiry into drug corruption in 1983.99 In the end, two cabinet ministers were forced to 
resign and a number of public officials and others were found culpable of active 
participation in the all-too-pervasive drug trade.100 Though there was no firm evidence 
that the young nation’s leader was guilty of involvement, the commission found that 
“…the whole nation must accept responsibility. Apathy and a weak public opinion” was 
to blame for the country’s dilemma.101  
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One silver lining behind the dark cloud was that the commission concluded that 
the police and defense forces were too poorly equipped to competently tackle the 
movement of drugs through The Bahamas enroute to the United States.102 The 
government responded by enlarging both of its law enforcement organizations to better 
prosecute the war on drugs.103 Mindful of The Bahamas’ enduring geostrategic 
importance to U.S. national security—as evidenced by a variety of sensitive American 
military facilities104 in Bahamian territory—both countries moved pragmatically to repair 
their relationship.105  
Nonetheless, in explaining his concerns with The Bahamas to Congress in March 
1989, President George H. W. Bush opined that “while the Government of the 
Commonwealth of The Bahamas is more active in investigating allegations of corruption, 
we are concerned by reports that corruption still exists. Prime Minister Pindling and his 
ministers must forcefully address the issue.”106 One month earlier, Bush’s administration 
had donated six decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutters to the RBDF in an effort to 
shore up the force’s aged and overworked fleet.107 Security cooperation between the two 
states markedly improved as their agencies regularly engaged in joint operations and 
training opportunities intended to disrupt the flow of drugs between them.108  
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Several agreements were signed with the intention of improving collective law 
enforcement and security. The 1984 Carryover Agreement, the 1990 TRIPART MOU on 
OPBAT, the 1992 Notes, and the 1996 Shiprider Agreement, among others, all served to 
build a mutually beneficial U.S.–Bahamian relationship.109 The high-level agreements 
have done rather less to interrupt the drug trade, however. It is notable that the U.S. 
Department of State’s 2015 report on international narcotics control indicates that 2014 
manifested record levels of marijuana seizure and eradication in Bahamian territory.110  
The State Department acknowledges, however, that the “Bahamian government 
and law enforcement authorities are committed to combating illicit trafficking, and the 
United States and The Bahamas have a strong counternarcotics relationship.”111 
Moreover, the Bahamian government’s recent $230 million investment to upgrade the 
RBDF fleet and infrastructure indicates the administration’s intent to secure Bahamian 
borders.  
D. CURRENT SEABORNE THREATS—TERRORISM, TOURISM, AND 
HAITIANS  
Since Al Qaeda’s successful attacks on the American homeland in 2001, U.S. 
policy has forced The Bahamas and others to examine more closely its security apparatus 
in general and the ports and harbors in particular. America intends to achieve “maritime 
domain awareness” by developing a comprehensive picture of the world’s maritime 
                                                 
109.  See “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of The Bahamas Concerning Cooperation in Maritime Law Enforcement” for the mentioned agreements: 
the 1984 Carryover Agreement is described as an “understanding concerning military operating rights and 
maritime practices effected by exchange of notes dated 5 April 1984” ; the 1990 TRIPART MOU on 
OPBAT is described as a “Memorandum of Understanding between the United States, The Bahamas and 
the United Kingdom, including Turks and Caicos Island, concerning cooperation in the Fight against Illicit 
Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs through the use of Equipment and Personnel Based at Great Inagua and such 
other Bases as may be established in Turks and Caicos Islands” ; the 1992 Notes are described as an 
“Understanding concerning drug interdiction and other operations” ; and the 1996 Shiprider Agreement 
described as an “Agreement concerning Cooperative Shiprider and overflight Drug Interdiction Program 
for Joint Operations.” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/108940.pdf.  
110.  Quincy Parker, “U.S.: Bahamas Should Speed Pending Drug Extradition Requests,” Nassau 
Guardian, 19 March 2015, http://www.thenassauguardian.com/bahamas-business/40-bahamas-business/
54731-usbaha.  
111.  U.S. Department of State, “Country Report: The Bahamas,” 2015 International Narcotics 
Strategy Report (INCSR), 1, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/voll/238945.htm.  
 26 
realm.112 For obvious reasons, Bahamian ports, which are frequented by cruise ships and 
other vessels laden with vacationing Americans, form an integral part of this realm. Even 
more, 9/11 acutely exposed the precarious nature of tourism as the principle source of 
Bahamian gross domestic product. The closure of harbors and airports in the wake of the 
attacks not only resulted in the loss of millions of dollars all across the Caribbean Basin, 
but it literally brought tourist-dependent economies to a dreadful standstill.113  
With so much at risk, no other challenge more epitomizes the current threat 
outlook of The Bahamas’ need to secure its porous borders than the seemingly Sisyphean 
Haitian immigrant problem, with which the country has grappled for more than fifty 
years. Just prior to independence, Bahamian efforts to control the growing illegal 
immigrant population resulted in migration toward Florida. At one point, an “estimated 
60 percent of all Haitians” living in Miami were believed to have previously lived in The 
Bahamas.114 Even though the Haitian population in The Bahamas showed no noticeable 
growth between the 1970s and 1990s, by the mid-1980s, public awareness of the 
immigrants peaked.115 The lopsided increase of Haitian communities on the islands of 
Abaco, Eleuthera, and Grand Bahama has manifested a xenophobic response throughout 
the country.116 
Regardless of efforts by the USCG and RBDF to stem the unrelenting flow of 
Haitians out of their impoverished homeland, nearly one thousand migrants have been 
apprehended attempting to enter The Bahamas illegally so far in 2015.117 Exacerbating 
the challenge of unabated Haitian incursions is that the 2010 National Census concluded 
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that nearly 40,000 Haitians were residing in The Bahamas, where the population at the 
time was merely 351,461.118 Even more troubling is the notion that Haiti has also 
become a transshipment point for drugs into the wider region.119 Such a proposition 
raises the stakes because drug and human smugglers are able to take advantage of the 
prevailing circumstances of escaping economic immigrants to trade in their wares.  
In all, The Bahamas is faced with the unfavorable dichotomy of keeping its ports 
open, accessible, and welcoming, while simultaneously ensuring the safety of its 
nationals and visitors in the age of transnational terrorism and organized crime. Security, 
then, is recognized by Bahamian and regional officials as the most important threat to the 
sustainability of their economic existence. At a recent Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) meeting of Caribbean leaders in Jamaica, which was attended by President 
Barack Obama, Prime Minister Christie implored the U.S. leader to use his good offices 
to curtail the flow of guns into the region.120 Implicit in Christie’s plea is the notion that 
guns originating in the United States are indiscriminately used to perpetrate violence 
throughout a region that does not produce them.  
Similarly, Caribbean leaders have found the U.S. policy of deporting non-
American nationals convicted of criminal conduct into the region to be an additional 
burden to stress resources. The policy forms part of the U.S. anti-crime and anti-terrorism 
initiative invoked in the 1990s for the purpose of reducing crime and mitigating the costs 
to taxpayers for incarcerated foreigners.121 Between 1993 and 1999, however, the 
“Caribbean saw a total of 34,411 persons, 71 percent of whom had committed criminal 
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offences, deported from the US.”122 Even if there is no empirical evidence to support the 
claim that the increase in crime being experienced throughout the Caribbean and Latin 
America is linked to the criminal alien deportation policy, foreign envoys report that 
“criminal activity among recent deportees is a ‘major factor’ or the ‘main reason’ for 
sharply rising crime rates” in their territories.123  
Implications of the program to the current national security concerns of The 
Bahamas are worth serious consideration. It is not inconceivable that criminal deportees 
are apt to introduce “new skills and transnational networks into the region that contribute 
to drug trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping and immigrant smuggling.”124 
Unleashing hardened professional criminals who earned their stripes in an advanced 
system like that of the United States upon an already-stressed criminal justice system in a 
region with minimally trained personnel and fiscal resources can result in more security 
degradation and concerns.125 U.S. decision-makers have promised to work through the 
International Organization for Migration in an effort to assist reintegration of criminal 
deportees into The Bahamas and other countries.126  
E. CONCLUSION  
As the gateway to the New World, The Bahamas was colonized for five centuries 
before gaining self-rule.127 Through the years, the islands have been steeped in maritime 
lawlessness and bathed in the ebb and flow of the fickle boom-bust economies central to 
such activities. Pirates in the 1600s, confederate blockade runners in the 1800s, 
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bootleggers in the 1920s, and drug smugglers and others from the 1970s on have all 
exploited the Bahamian maritime domain. 
As the world community has moved toward more accountability, an independent 
Bahamian government could not turn a blind eye to maritime criminality as did its 
colonial predecessors. Since 1973, while under the steady gaze of the most powerful 
country in the world, the Bahamian government has struggled to earn its place among the 
community of nations. 
The jury is still out on whether the country is earning the trust and respectability 
necessary to be considered a trusted partner and committed ally in the security complex. 
It is certain, however, that there is much more to be done to secure The Bahamian 
maritime domain, and that the United States and The Bahamas are inextricably linked by 
their geography. As such, both must continue finding ways to bring to and maintain order 
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III. BAHAMIAN NATIONAL INSECURITY 
The claim of a modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential 
to it as the character of compulsory jurisdiction and continuous 
organization.  
—Max Weber, 1964 
 
According to Huntington, whether developing societies build and maintain 
institutions is decided by the capacity of their people.128 The post-colonial development 
and upkeep of Bahamian institutions like the RBDF and National Insurance Board—to 
safeguard the country’s borders and provide for the social welfare of citizens, 
respectively—arguably, suffices Huntington’s capacity criteria in favor of Bahamians. 
However, as previously mentioned, The Bahamas lacks a national security strategy 
suitable to the task of competently addressing the issues of domestic crime, transnational 
crime, illegal emigration, poaching, and other threats to national security. To what extent 
can Nassau be said to be maintaining Bahamian institutions without a comprehensive and 
current national security strategy? 
The Bahamas has an NSC, at least in name. However, Bahamian leaders have 
traditionally settled for allowing the Ministry of National Security to serve as the 
“foremost government entity charged with the responsibility” of managing national 
security affairs and security forces.129 The security problems of The Bahamas have 
visibly outgrown the coverage capacity of a single ministry and must include the 
dedicated considerations of other ministries and agencies with a view to enabling 
comprehensive solutions to extant challenges.  
Developing democratic states—like The Bahamas—struggle to establish distinct 
lines of separation between civilian and military roles as required for CMR to operate as 
effectively as it should. In the ideal national security policy-making situation, “political 
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leaders set clear objectives that support national interests” and the armed forces “clearly 
explain their capabilities and coordinate them toward achieving the strategic objective at 
a reasonable cost.”130 This outcome becomes more achievable with the existence of an 
effective and functioning NSC.  
This chapter discusses the present posture of the Bahamian NSC, the 
fundamentals of an effective NSC, and the peculiar—and ambivalent—role that 
American security policy plays in the Bahamian national security stance.  
A. CURRENT POSTURE OF THE BAHAMIAN NSC 
In its current deportment, the NSC—since its establishment in 1980—has yet to 
propose a national security plan or strategy to meet the internal or external threats to The 
Bahamas. The body plays no visible public role in the administration of the country’s 
national security affairs. This reality persists despite the present construct of the NSC, 
whose politically appointed members include the prime minister, minister of defense 
(today national security), and any other minister or person appointed by the prime 
minister.131  
Maybe like its powerful neighbor to the north—albeit on a much smaller scale in 
all conceivable aspects—The Bahamas can move rapidly to establish an all-inclusive 
approach to national security that will enable mitigation of the country’s many 
challenges. In contrast to the NSC in the United States—established by the 1947 National 
Security Act specifically to advise the president in an integrated fashion on domestic, 
foreign, and military policies involving national security—the NSC in The Bahamas, 
instituted within the 1980 Defence Force Act, merely holds an administrative function in 
the hierarchy of the RBDF.132 Thus, the NSC might determine leadership, deployment, 
and disciplinary issues, among other things, relevant to the management of the RBDF. 
Except for these very seldom-exercised administrative powers over the RBDF, the 
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Bahamian version of the NSC concerns itself with few, if any, roles or missions of an 
effective NSC. Further, it is not readily recognized as an independent advisory organ to 
inform policy decisions of the government, even though it might be called on—from time 
to time—by the prime minister to consider matters relevant to the RBDF.133 Therefore, 
the NSC exists in isolation of the legislature—unless invoked in the House of Assembly 
or the Senate—with the imprimatur of the prime minister or minister of national security. 
In reality, then, the NSC does not actively participate in national security strategy and 
planning initiatives to address concerns unless activated by the prime minister to so do. 
As a result, the Commander Defence Force is left to deal with the operational command 
of the RBDF with the directions of the minister of national security.134 Subsequently, the 
RBDF and ministry of national security are left to work through their respective defense 
and security bailiwicks devoid of interaction with a deliberate national security. The 
minister of national security carries nearly sole responsibility for executing the 
government’s national security policies relevant to illegal immigration, drug smuggling, 
poaching, domestic crime, transnational crime, and others. 
At present, the role of the Bahamian NSC is to organize the work, functions, 
duties, and responsibilities of its members—inclusive of all matters essential to managing 
matters relative to the RBDF—as determinable by its members.135 Accordingly, the 
council is virtually unrestricted in determining strategic policy and plans involving the 
RBDF, at least in principle. This assertion is founded on the notion that with the nation’s 
chief executive as its chairman—even in its current legal construct as merely an 
administrative body—the NSC can effect security policy and strategy if it so chooses.136 
Except for its traditional posture, there is no impediment to the NSC injecting itself more 
deliberately in national security affairs beyond the mere management of the RBDF. 
Moreover, as the body presently can determine its own use, it is free to establish itself as 
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an all-inclusive NSC with all of the necessary ministries, agencies, experts, and mandates 
to address threats to national security.  
 Nonetheless, Prime Minister Christie’s recent promise to “spare no effort” to 
enact legislation aimed at addressing the mandate of the recently formed National 
Intelligence Agency and modernizing the NSC to manage the broader security sector 
concerns of the country has yet to be realized.137 While Christie offered no details as to 
the objectives of his legislative overture, such an outcome might serve to bring focused 
organization to the country’s trying national security affairs.  
B. ESSENTIALS OF AN OPTIMALLY FUNCTIONING NSC  
Although the specific features of NSCs differ from country to country, an 
optimally working NSC seeks to develop an all-embracing, incorporated, and coherent 
national security strategy.138 At its best, then, an NSC accounts for all national security 
concerns, involves each essential agency, and produces an implementable strategic plan 
to effectively tackle challenges. After all, the purpose of an NSC is to create strategies 
that “align policy with operational capabilities.”139 Furthermore, experts hold that NSCs 
should fulfill at least seven main functions:  (1) advising the nation’s leader on policies of 
national security and defense, (2) synchronizing the activities of national security and 
defense agencies, (3) communicating with national legislators on matters concerned with 
national security and defense, (4) correlating intelligence, (5) developing a national 
security and defense strategy, (6) ensuring cooperation between national security and 
defense agencies, and (7) executing determined strategies by establishing a nexus 
between the diplomatic corps and national security and defense exertions.140 No 
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country’s NSC fulfills all seven of these roles, “but if a government wants any or all of 
them dealt with,” experts say an NSC-type organization is required.141  
The Bahamian NSC fulfills none of these functions. Arguably, however, but for 
the production of a national security strategy, facilitation of the interaction of 
intelligence, and coordination of diplomatic and security exertions, it can be inferred that 
the ministry of national security is reasonably linked to the remaining functions by virtue 
of its daily management of Bahamian security forces. Therefore, seemingly following the 
pre-independence British model of ad hoc security management, the ministry of national 
security’s nexus to any of the seven elements of an effective NSC is at best incidental. 
The Bahamas desperately requires an approach to national security that recognizes a 
documented and implementable national strategy and is managed by civilian and military 
security professionals. Such an approach has never been followed in The Bahamas.  
As the cabinet minister with responsibility for national defense and security, the 
minister of national security is charged with directing the daily strategic affairs of 
security agencies. As a result, security of the country’s borders and the management of 
domestic crime demand the minister’s undivided attention. The minister’s principle 
responsibility is to drive security policies, coordinate security agencies, and report to 
cabinet and lawmakers on matters pertinent to national security.142  
As seen in the American context, an optimally functioning NSC must strive to 
provide an inclusive system of interacting bodies concerned with defense, foreign 
relations, and the overall interests of the nation.143 Put another way, the U.S. “National 
Security Council exists to make strategy, to align policy with operational capabilities.”144 
To be sure, the U.S. institution is not an exact-fit model for most states. Still, even in its 
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most basic iteration, an NSC must be concerned with “creating inclusivity, diversity, and 
coordinated national security policy” to achieve the overall national objectives.145  
Inclusivity translates to harmonization—as much as practicably possible—of 
agencies, departments, and decision-makers with a view to collectively informing the 
execution of policy.146 In essence, various functions and roles of state machinery 
necessary to tackling assorted security challenges are deliberately and methodically 
coordinated toward this end. Diplomatic, intelligence, defense, economic, energy, and 
security initiatives and exertions that “fit in with the nation’s geopolitical prospects and 
economic health” will become focused and less impromptu in nature.147  
The idea is that all of the stakeholders, charged with analyzing specific issues of 
national import and implementing possible solutions, coordinate their efforts to solve 
problems.148 A national security strategy for The Bahamas should manifest awareness of 
offerings by relevant public think tanks, diplomatic exertions, the environmental response 
and protection operatives, tourism, the economy, the fishing industry, and other elements 
that pertain to a comprehensive national security policy. All of the diverse areas 
mentioned must be coordinated through the NSC to develop an integrated approach to 
Bahamian national security beyond just security and defense, as is currently the case. 
This outcome will demand not only political leadership and professionally trained 
military officers, but also a cadre of educated and trained civilians conversant with CMR 
and strategic planning and policy implementation.  
Consequently, when operating at its finest, an NSC or its surrogate distills and 
correlates pertinent information that leads to policy making by the chief executive, 
synchronizes and ensures execution of strategies, liaises with legislators to procure 
oversight and funding of security and defense initiatives proffered by the executive, 
deciphers various intelligence strains for use by policy-makers, writes national security 
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missives for necessary dissemination, shapes concord between stakeholders with the 
imprimatur of the chief executive, and provides alternatives to normal diplomatic 
channels.149 An NSC capable of achieving these roles is indispensable to the well-being 
of a nation’s universal interests.  
More importantly, however, is the proposition that a best-functioning NSC 
enables the execution of the myriad roles and responsibilities of the national security 
complex by creating a one-stop option, where all of the moving parts are present.150 This 
arrangement removes the potential for gaps or lags in communication or coordination that 
might lead to ruinous consequences. Through an involved and participatory NSC, more 
cohesion is brought to bear on the challenges of a country in all spheres of security 
operations. Moreover, such an outcome furthers potential realization, not only of national 
security, but also national economic development. An integrated NSC that is 
representative of all stakeholders—including political, military, non-governmental, 
intelligence, foreign affairs, and others—is critical to enhancing civilian control and 
effectiveness of the military in democracies.151  
C. U.S. INFLUENCE ON THE BAHAMAS  
The Bahamas’ dependent existence in the looming hegemonic shadow of the 
United States possibly accounts for the lack of inspiration demonstrated by Bahamian 
leaders to more ardently shape the country’s national security outcome. Since realizing 
self-rule in 1973, The Bahamas has striven to “maintain its place as one of the most 
politically stable, if not most complex, Caribbean nations in the modern world.”152 It is 
undeniable that the multiplex nature of the country, distinct from others in the region, is 
in no small measure attributable to its proximity to the United States, from where The 
Bahamas derives the lion share of its tourists.  
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The drug problem—which might be at the root of the current challenges faced by 
the young nation—exemplifies this reality. Arguably, no other country in the region 
experienced the weight of American expectations due to the “US-led, hemispheric anti-
drug cooperation” policies like The Bahamas.153 The strategic importance of The 
Bahamas to the drug trade moved American officials to turn off the spigot from which 
drugs flowed through The Bahamas into the United States, while simultaneously 
requiring Bahamian authorities to respond in kind if the country wished to arrest 
America’s then-waning favor.154  
Moreover, other than Puerto Rico the islands of The Bahamas “contain more 
strategic U.S. military installations than any other area in the Caribbean, and they control 
hundreds of miles of northern approaches to that sea… [Thus, they] warrant a kind of 
special concern within America’s Caribbean policy.”155 Perhaps of even more strategic 
importance than the Operation Bahamas and Turks & Caicos Islands Agreement 
(OPBAT) facilities is the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center 
(AUTEC), strategically situated near the tongue of the ocean at Andros. This subsurface 
facility is “utilized for testing of new types of weaponry” and avails ready defense of the 
eastern seaboard of the United States.156 
Forced to recalibrate its efforts following disclosures of corruption and 
inadequacies in the 1980s, Bahamian authorities readily banded with American officials 
to reduce drug trafficking. As a result, The Bahamas “on a per capita basis, was 
unequaled anywhere else in the world” in its response to U.S. initiatives to stamp out the 
drug trade through The Bahamas.157 Even if reluctantly, Bahamian leaders readily 
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acquiesced to requests for American assets and operatives to enter Bahamian territory at 
will in order to execute drug interdiction efforts.158  
Bahamian support of the U.S. drug strategy was further manifested by being the 
only one out of forty-three CARICOM countries to ratify the 1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances—
alongside the United States.159 By so doing, Bahamian political leaders arguably signaled 
their complete alliance with the United States in the war on drugs.  
In reality, the USCG—and by extension the U.S. government—has enjoyed 
unfettered formal access to Bahamian territory since the 1964 Grey Agreement between 
Washington and London. The USCG has been able to enter Bahamian waters without 
much fuss for many years. Therefore, Bahamian shortfalls along the way in the war on 
drugs through its territory are not completely unrelated to American shortcomings in this 
regard. In short, it might be reasoned that since American operatives—who have 
historically enjoyed decades of relatively free way in Bahamian waters—also fell short of 
the mark in preventing drugs entering the United States from Bahamian space. 
Even more, among the numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between 
countries to mitigate drug trafficking, none more exemplifies the agreed efforts of 
partner-nations like the 1983 Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Island 
Agreement (OPBAT), which approved the permanent stationing of American air assets 
strategically throughout The Bahamas.  
The multi-agency tripartite arrangement represents an “international drug 
interdiction effort focused on stopping the flow of illegal drugs from South America and 
the Caribbean through The Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and the United States.”160 
Essentially, OPBAT enables the United States to shore up Bahamian equipment and 
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operational deficits by placing U.S. Coast Guard and Army equipment and specialized 
personnel at joint operation bases in Nassau, Exuma, and Great Inagua.161 Although 
counter-narcotics efforts are the main focus of the agreement, the agreement also avails 
the use of assets for disaster mitigation response, immigrant interdiction, and search and 
rescue operations throughout The Bahamas.162 In 2013, the operation had succeeded in 
reducing the “flow of cocaine through The Bahamas from 80% to 10% and is considered 
one of the most successful counter drug enforcement initiatives in the region.”163  
Based on the lack of Bahamian effort to create a national security strategic policy 
and the country’s dependence on American support, it is arguable that Bahamian 
executives are content to wait for the United States to turn its attention to Bahamian 
problems as it did with the drug issue. All told, Bahamians have become dependent on 
the United States for not just tourism, but also for determining challenges of strategic 
importance to both nations.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Observers note that great powers take unilateral action relative to their interests 
across the globe, but “they find it difficult to allow the same privilege to small 
countries.”164 Developing countries, particularly those like The Bahamas that are solely 
dependent upon good external relations and favorable international conditions to maintain 
their viability, are often forced to make adjustments as a result of unilateral United States 
policy initiatives. In the case of The Bahamas and the United States, however, it is 
unlikely that America will object to any initiative put forward by The Bahamas to 
safeguard the country’s territorial integrity because by so doing, American borders are 
also made more secure.  
                                                 
161.  Military.com Network, “OPBAT—Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands,” accessed 
31 October 2015, http://www.military.com/HomePage/UnitPageFullText/0.13476.710582.00.html.  
162.  U.S. Embassy, “U.S. and Bahamian Officials Attend Opening.” 
163.  Ibid.  
164.  Lewis, “The Bahamas in International Politics,” 148.  
 41 
More than forty years ago, The Bahamas’ first prime minister, Lynden O. 
Pindling, recognized the important geopolitical positioning of his country and articulated 
the following at his party’s 1975 annual convention: 
The Bahamas, with an area of 100,000 square miles, not 5,000 square 
miles [measuring its land only], sits astride the most important sea-lanes 
linking the Caribbean, Central America and the Gulf of Mexico, to Eastern 
North America and Western Europe. These realities give The Bahamas a 
strategic significance over other Caribbean territories. In addition to the 
fact of the strategic location of The Bahamas, the nature of the Bahamian 
submarine geography has caused it to be selected as a site for facilities 
connected with the United States global submarine defence strategy.165 
Pindling rightly outlined the importance of his country’s fortuitous geographical 
location—which has undoubtedly enabled it to lead the Caribbean region in per capita 
GDP—but he possibly underestimated the strategic importance of a secure Bahamian 
territory to the security of the United States. Likely even more importantly, Pindling 
misjudged America’s resolve to shut down the drug trade in Bahamian waters.  
The current Bahamian prime minister, faced with a spiraling crime problem, 
indicates his government’s intent to take concrete steps toward incorporating the NSC 
more readily into the country’s national security paradigm. Encouragingly, by so doing 
Christie has become the first Bahamian prime minister in forty-two years of an 
independent Bahamas to appreciate the need for greater coordination of the country’s 
national security efforts. Christie, however, faces a colossal task of creating a 
bureaucratic regime that no longer leaves the minister of national security as the sole 
arbiter charged with defending and securing The Bahamas. Admittedly, such an endeavor 
will receive some resistance on the part of the minister of national security. This will also 
mean educating and training civilians—beyond their current ordinary public service 
administrative requirements—to engage in the planning and management of issues 
related to national security. 
Unless Bahamians can bridge the gap between the recognition of challenges and 
the development of solutions aimed toward achieving the desired outcomes, while 
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managing collective expectations over requirements, the country’s national insecurity 
will only intensify. Surely enabling the Bahamian NSC to become deliberately involved 
in policy making “based on careful analysis of the international situation, including 
diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military,” and other necessary factors, will not alone 
provide the much-needed panacea to the myriad of security and other problems.166 To 
ameliorate the multifaceted Haitian problem will require far more. An operationalized 
NSC, however, would represent a step toward finally developing a comprehensive plan 
for Bahamian national security.  
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IV. THE BAHAMIAN–HAITIAN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
PROBLEM  
Wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born. 
—Matthew Arnold, 1855 
 
Often described as stubborn and extremely vexing, unabated illegal immigration 
of Haitians to The Bahamas forms an entrenched and complex problem with national 
security implications. It continues to burden Bahamian resources while authorities persist 
with the same ineffective response of “catch and release”—the long-standing policy of 
apprehending undocumented Haitian nationals in Bahamian territory and forcing their 
repatriation to Haiti. This approach has been practiced by Bahamian governments since 
before independence. In the meantime, untold numbers of Haitians perish at sea annually 
in boats that are unseaworthy while seeking a better life elsewhere.  
This chapter discusses the Haitian problem as generally seen from the Bahamian 
perspective, along with contemporary Haitian political and economic challenges that 
have fueled the constant efforts of Haitian nationals to immigrate to The Bahamas at the 
risk of tragically dying at sea. It also establishes the extent to which Haitian immigration 
demands a national strategic response, although to date, no comprehensive national 
security strategy has been forthcoming.  
A. THE HAITIAN PROBLEM 
Though an extremely politically charged and divisive topic throughout the 
Bahamian archipelago, expressed through sporadic and mostly venomous missives to 
editors of national dailies, successive Bahamian governments have failed to prioritize 
illegal Haitian immigration as a national security imperative. Bahamians generally 
believe that Haitians are taking over their country with little effort while authorities sit 
idly by, doing little to nothing to ameliorate the issue. 
Dawn Marshall’s 1979 book The Haitian Problem: Illegal Migration to the 
Bahamas offers a dispassionate, scholarly study of the issue of Haitian immigration to 
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The Bahamas. Among other things, Marshall’s work calls for a pragmatic and reasonable 
approach by all in efforts to solve the problem.167 The problem, she writes, is 
multifaceted and deeply complex. Illegal Haitian immigrants are a “crucial source of 
cheap, reliable, motivated labor” that has tremendously benefitted the Bahamian 
agricultural sector.168 A recent comment by the Bahamian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Fred Mitchell, however, exemplifies growing Bahamian anxiety over the issue of 
unchecked illegal immigration to the country by Haitian nationals. Concerned about the 
general tenor of a Haitian–Bahamian community meeting in Nassau, Mitchell asserted 
that some rhetoric used by participants in the meeting “bordered on incitement” and 
encouraged a police investigation of the matter.169  
As such, the problem touches every conceivable facet of the political and 
socioeconomic spheres of The Bahamas. Bahamian employees seek cheap labor, which 
migrants readily supply; Bahamian laborers seek better wages, which immigrants drive 
down through their willingness to work for less. As a result, Haitian immigrants are seen 
as a source of obtaining wealth by business owners and as a threat by workers whose 
livelihoods they jeopardize. Haitian children born in The Bahamas are constitutionally 
entitled to apply for citizenship at the age of eighteen.  
Elected politicians must also manage the fiscal burdens—perceived or real, as no 
recent empirical data has been publicized—that immigrants place on national services, 
such as education and health care.170 As a result, already meager fiscal resources that 
might be otherwise used to address much-needed infrastructural upgrades, the fight 
against rising crime levels, and securing the territorial integrity of The Bahamas are 
redirected to support a growing illegal immigrant population.  
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1. Contemporary Haitian Immigration to The Bahamas  
The Bahamas and Haiti share historical linkages that go back to their discovery by 
Columbus in 1492. Their proximity in the Caribbean Sea (they are separated by only 
sixty nautical miles across the Windward Passage) and their shared colonial and ancestral 
African roots facilitated economic and trade linkages between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.171  
Stimulated by the rising Bahamian tourism economy of the 1950s and 
deteriorating political conditions in Haiti that resulted from the dictatorial practices of 
Jean-Claude “Papa Doc” Duvalier, Haitian nationals started immigrating to and through 
the islands of The Bahamas in what seemed like waves.172 Also, because not “enough 
Bahamians wanted the onerous and unglamorous job of farm management, but even 
fewer wanted the back-breaking, sun-burnt ‘slavery’ of farm labour,” an opening existed 
in The Bahamas for Haitian laborers.173  
In 1957, farm laborers from the northwestern province of Haiti were aggressively 
recruited to work on a large-scale farming operation on the island of Abaco.174 By the 
1960s, the number of Haitian nationals living and working in The Bahamas—some 
10,000 by 1962 and 20,000 by 1969—increased exponentially.175  
2. Haitian Immigrants Recognized as a Problem 
By the 1970s—likely inspired by growing public impatience with the illegal 
immigration challenge and the need to secure promised jobs for Bahamians at all levels—
even more focused national attention was brought to bear on the Haitian problem.176 By 
the 1990s, Bahamians blamed the increasingly visible Haitian communities for “every 
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social and medical ill imaginable: tuberculosis, cholera, AIDS, malaria, prostitution, drug 
dealing, theft, violent crime, gang warfare, etc.”177  
By 2007, it was estimated that 75,000 Haitians in The Bahamas accounted for 
nearly 25 percent of the Bahamian population.178 However, a 2013 International 
Migration Organizations (IMO) report indicated that there were between 20,000 and 
50,000 undocumented Haitians living in The Bahamas. All things considered, Bahamian 
laborers found themselves competing with Haitian laborers willing to work for far less in 
a Bahamas with few jobs outside of the tourist industry or the civil service. Such a reality 
represents a terrifying proposition for many Bahamians, who live with the inherent fear 
that they are soon to be outnumbered by Haitian nationals in their homeland.  
Bahamians initially took little notice of Haitian immigrants, as they often returned 
to Haiti or journeyed onward to the United States and Canada.179 Evidence of successful 
Haitian immigrants to The Bahamas, along with worsening conditions in Haiti, however, 
not only encouraged more immigration, but also resulted in fewer willing returns to 
Haiti.180 This reality forced the Bahamian government to enforce stricter immigration 
laws and policies to curtail the growing issue. As a result, the government of The 
Bahamas began the policy of rounding up and deporting illegal Haitian nationals in 
1956.181  
An immigration act was enacted under the newly minted constitution of 1963 by 
the British government in London to address concerns over the growing Haitian 
population in the colony. Among other things, the immigration act established a 
designation for the increasing number of children born to foreigners in the country who 
had previously claimed the status of “Belonger” and the right to permanent residency.182  
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3. Bahamian Response to the Haitian Problem 
Elected on the promise of “Bahamianization—which might both reduce the ratio 
of whites in the population and raise the numbers of as yet unqualified non-white 
Bahamians to positions of wealth and power,” Pindling’s 1967 administration set out to 
stabilize apparently unregulated immigration in the country.183 The fledgling 
government’s immigration policy quickly came under heavy fire for allowing more 
latitude to white-collar workers—mostly from the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada—while turning a blind eye to the practice of importing “cheap black labour” 
from Haiti by businesses in the country.184 Nonetheless, the policies of the new 
government aimed to mitigate illegal immigration from Haiti did little to slow the 
flow.185  
Notwithstanding steady deportations, Haitians continued surreptitiously making 
their way to The Bahamas while justifications were supplied for the undisturbed presence 
of expatriate foreign workers as needed specialists in the banking and tourism industries. 
The government’s philosophy on immigration might be summed up as follows: “While 
welcoming the outsider who can contribute towards the economy of The Bahamas, there 
will be no compromise on opposing the influx of foreigners which reduce the earning 
capacity of the Bahamian.”186  
Undeterred, the new regime sought to build on the 1963 immigration act, which 
granted immigration officers such sweeping powers as to “search without a warrant, to 
interrogate persons wishing to enter the Colony and require persons to sign a declaration 
of their intent, the power to require such persons to submit to medical examination, the 
power to arrest any suspected person without a warrant; indeed, Immigration Officers 
were given all the powers, privileges, protections and authorities conferred by law on a 
police officer.”187  
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Despite best efforts by immigration authorities, “it seemed clear that up to that 
time the official policy of the Bahamian Government was not deterring the illegal Haitian 
migrants.”188 In desperation, the administration reportedly offered a reward of “two 
dollars a head” to any member of the public who turned in illegal immigrants.189 Further, 
the government engaged Haitian officials in hopes of receiving support with the issue.190  
B. HAITI’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES  
Certainly, no other country in the Caribbean and Latin America—and few in the 
world—has demonstrated the strength and determination of Haiti as manifested in the 
defeat of France and the procurement of Haitian independence in 1804.191 Since Haiti’s 
courageous stance, however, the country has made marginal advancements and has for 
many years distinguished itself as being the poorest and most dysfunctional state in the 
western hemisphere.192 Accordingly, there has been an “historical and widespread 
Haitian propensity to migrate,” and their route of choice has been predominantly to The 
Bahamas and then to Miami, where there is also a sizeable Haitian population.193  
All told, immigration has been appropriately described by experts as a “traditional 
‘escape valve’ for Haitians.”194 In relatively recent years, the oppressive regime of 
Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier (1957–1971), which both exemplified and amplified all 
manner of abuses that might be heaped on a people burdened by dictatorial rule, only 
served to exacerbate endemic political and social problems and fuel large swaths of mass-
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migration from the country.195 The politically ruthless Papa Doc indiscriminately killed 
anyone who dared to oppose his dictatorship and thereby ruled his country by pervasive 
fear. Many had little choice except to leave in search of a better chance at life.196  
1. Haitian Resource Challenge  
Often described as a kleptocratic state—one in which the “rule and misuse of state 
funds” is the norm—the Haitian government has traditionally ignored the frequent 
migration of Haitians en masse, and more often than not, under dangerous and perilous 
conditions.197 With limited resources at home, there is little incentive for Haitian officials 
to stop illegal migration that provides an opportunity for foreign income that might be 
earned in the neighboring Bahama Islands.  
Scholars assert that between “1976 and 1982 Haiti received $618 million in 
foreign aid” that was largely abused by the country’s leaders.198 Also, remitted monies 
have been influential in building the private housing sector of Haiti.199 Haitian 
officials—likely incentivized by the prospect of foreign capital through international aid 
or remittances from migrant workers—have done very little to stem the flow of Haitian 
nationals to The Bahamas and elsewhere, as their prospects greatly improve abroad.200  
Furthermore, until recently Bahamian citizens—who’ve generally enjoyed a 
relatively good economy and the ability to engage the cheap labor furnished by the large 
illegal Haitian immigrant population—have complained periodically, but have offered 
little help in mitigating the problem. The often nonchalant approach by immigration 
officials and indiscriminate hiring by those wanting cheap laborers, coupled with those 
who saw no issues with Haitian nationals being in the country presented three challenges 
for the government. These challenges included: “the ingenuity of the illegal immigrants 
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in staying under cover, the connivance of Bahamian employers who welcomed workers 
who toiled hard for low wages, and sentiments of Bahamian black liberals” that saw 
similarities between Haitian and Bahamian culture.201 
The end of the despotic Duvalier regime only intensified the efforts of Haitians to 
leave their native land in search of a better life for fear that the military now in charge of 
the country would intensify the abusive treatment it was known for as an instrument of 
the president. The months after Duvalier left, the USCG reported dramatic increases in 
interceptions of Haitian immigrants at sea.202 With the end of Papa Doc Francois’ rule, 
his equally corrupt and violent son, Jean-Claude, callously carried on abusing the people 
and plundering the country’s scarce resources. As a result, estimates of Haitian nationals 
residing illegally in The Bahamas rose to forty thousand by the 1980s.203  
To add insult to injury, Jean-Claude and his close cronies were jetted off to the 
south of France and the lap of luxury with more than $1 billion in 1986, while penniless 
Haitian immigrants doubled their efforts to escape abstract poverty by risking life and 
limb in unseaworthy boats in hopes of reaching the islands of The Bahamas.204 
Undoubtedly, the willingness of Bahamians to hire cheap laborers, coupled with the ease 
of penetrating porous Bahamian maritime borders, offer irresistible conditions for 
Haitians just across the Windward Passage.205  
Many Haitian immigrants made claims of political abuse when escaping their 
military-controlled homeland in hopes of acquiring political asylum in any country that 
would take them. American and Bahamian immigration officials—who were primarily 
forced to deal with the exodus—deemed the immigrants economic and returned them 
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directly to Haiti.206 They could be directly returned to their homeland once it was 
determined that they had no legitimate claim for political asylum.207  
2. Emigrants Support the Haitian Economy  
In recent years, along with the IMO, the Haitian government has attempted to 
increase job opportunities in hopes of diminishing emigration.208 Despite claims by the 
IMO that it helped more than “22,000 people in the Port-de-Paix area” with jobs, “three-
quarters of Haiti’s adult population” remain jobless.209 Such prospects do not bode well 
for halting emigration, which since 1990 has become exceptionally important to the 
development of migrant countries like Haiti, with large unemployed and relatively 
unskilled populations.210  
The veracity of claims by the Haitian government that it wants to reduce Haitian 
emigration is questionable, since remittances directed toward Haiti by emigrants are 
substantial. Experts aver that the numbers of emigrants produced by a country can have a 
substantially positive impact upon its economy.211 Monies sent home by Haitian workers 
abroad accounted for Haiti’s 2006 ranking as the recipient of the highest per annum 
percentage of GDP in remittances.212 The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 
2006 reports that “remittances to middle- and low-income countries in 1990 amounted to 
about US$31 billion.”213 By 2005, remittances reached an astounding US$200 billion, of 
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which US$50 billion went to the Latin America and Caribbean region.214 In 2012, 
remittances to Haiti from the United States were estimated to be US$1.1 billion.215 
During that same year, US$29 million was directed toward Haiti from The Bahamas.216  
That said, it must be noted that as with immigrants, reliable statistics on 
remittances are elusive and it is believed that unofficial transfers are actually “2.5 times 
that formally recorded.”217 With 5,000 documented and perhaps upward to 50,000 
undocumented Haitians in The Bahamas, it is not inconceivable that the unofficial 
transfer of monies to Haiti is astronomically more than formally recorded.218 Either way, 
it is reasonable to assert that Haitian immigrants to The Bahamas sent more than US$72 
million to Haiti in 2012. Haiti’s per capita GDP in 2012 was reported to be US$1,200.219  
3. Equipment and Manpower Deficits  
Apart from the very strong disincentive provided by remittances from emigrants, 
the Haitian government is hard-pressed to mitigate emigration due to its lack of human 
and other resources. It is simply not enough for Haitians abroad to send monies home, but 
academics agree that “Haitian expatriate human capital must relocate back to Haiti.”220 
Such a proposition, however, is unlikely until Haiti’s economic and political dispositions 
demonstrate more promise. 
Additionally, as the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, Haiti has literally 
no resources to spend on initiatives aimed at preventing illegal emigration. The mayor of 
the island of Tortuga—an active embarkation point for many making the journey to The 
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Bahamas—puts the point thus: “We have one policeman for 45,000 inhabitants.”221 This 
ratio is curious, though, because the Haitian National Police Force’s (HNP) complement 
was recently increased to 12,200, most of whom are deployed elsewhere in the country to 
fight the drug problem.222  
Nonetheless, direct responsibility for securing the nation’s open maritime borders 
falls to the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG), which is gravely undermanned and without 
essential matériel, but operates bases in Cap Haitien (North region), Killick (Port-au-
Prince), and Les Cayes.223 While just less than forty nautical miles northwest of Cap 
Haitien from an HCG base in the north of Haiti, covering migrant activity in Tortuga 
presents quite a challenge for a maritime force that has 134 personnel, lacks essential 
equipment, and is without resources.224 The HCG has a complement of twenty maritime 
units, of which eight are serviceable.225 What is more, the entity’s operational capacity is 
low due to “insufficient funding, management deficiencies, and inability to refuel and 
maintain” its vessels.226 Haitian resources are scarce for funding the HCG, but unless 
more is done, Haitians will likely continue to die tragically at sea.  
4. Too Many Tragic Deaths at Sea  
Over the years, it is believed that “thousands of Haitians risk their lives trying to 
make the perilous sea voyage from their country to one of its wealthier Caribbean 
neighbours.”227 American State Department officials have estimated that “as many as 
half the Haitian boat people die at sea during the voyage” to neighboring countries.228 In 
pursuit of a better existence they “cram themselves into small boats which are often far 
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from seaworthy” and they “run the risk of capsizing” at sea.229 These unsanitary vessels 
carry no life vests despite having passengers who are predominantly non-swimmers.230 
Ruthless immigrant smugglers, who prey on the desperation of those seeking a 
way out of Haiti, are known to have “literally push[ed] people in the water” miles from 
shore, often resulting in their drowning.231 In 2013, the New York Times reported that at 
least thirty Haitians drowned in the central Bahamas near Harvey Cays in the Exumas.232 
Here, a forty-foot Haitian sloop—a locally built wooden sailboat—with approximately 
sixty souls on board ran aground and capsized while likely en route to Nassau, New 
Providence.233 This scene has been repeated too many times in the past and is highly 
likely to be repeated in the future unless efforts are made to address the issue.  
C. ABSENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
At present, it is conceivable that unless the Haitian problem is handled in a far 
more meaningful fashion by the Bahamian national security complex than is presently the 
case, civil unrest is possible.234 According to a local daily, the U.S. government deems 
the situation uncontrollable and asserts that it has the “potential to explode someday in 
The Bahamas if constructive policies are not introduced” to settle attending problems 
such as integration of Haitian immigrants.235 The knotty issue has “been an obvious 
challenge to successive governments due in large part to limited resources and some 
would say, a lack of planning.”236  
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The Bahamian national security plan to mitigate the Haitian problem, as practiced 
for more than fifty years now, has been almost entirely spontaneous. Nonetheless, during 
the last general elections campaign cycle in 2012, both major political parties vying for 
governance of The Bahamas promised measures to mitigate Haitian immigration to the 
country. Both generally promised to better secure Bahamian borders in part by fortifying 
the ability of security agencies to better execute their task.  
The governing Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) said that it would safeguard the 
country from illegal immigrants and “promote policies that seek to bring about 
harmonious, sound development and integration among all persons acting lawfully within 
our borders.”237 The official opposition, the Free National Movement (FNM), at the time 
the incumbent administration, vowed to “reduce illegal immigration through the 
continuous conduct of regular and routine arrests, detention and repatriation,” coupled 
with efforts to regularize the status of children born in the country to non-Bahamians.238 
Both political parties ultimately made the same promise, but neither ventured into 
detailing any plan to accomplish their declarations. 
The Bahamas is yet to invoke a national security strategy beyond materiel and 
manpower to stop illegal Haitian immigrants from invading the country at will. Hence, 
apprehend, detain, and repatriate remains the policy of the day.  
D. CONCLUSION  
At a meeting convened in March 2015 by the IMO to address the matter of the 
“tragic and troubling issue of migrants by sea from North Africa to Europe,” a Bahamian 
spokesperson informed the body that some three thousand illegal immigrants—the 
overwhelming majority of whom were Haitian—had been repatriated to their home 
countries at the expense of the Bahamian taxpayer thus far that year.239 Moreover, during 
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the mid-year budget communiqué to Parliament, the minister responsible for immigration 
informed the country that the $BS 1.5 million allotted for annual repatriations had been 
depleted.240 Apart from the recurring costs of search and rescue and lodging of illegal 
immigrants, other services, including education, transportation, and health, are deprived 
of much-needed fiscal support.241  
Since the late 1960s, Bahamian executives—being acutely aware of the seemingly 
insolubility and entrenched outlook of the Haitian problem and the impending political 
backlash sure to follow—reached out to the Haitian executives who could offer no more 
than a promise of receiving forcibly returned nationals.242 Since then, the situation 
remains the same. Despite the departure of predatory political elites and undemocratic 
military regimes from the power base of Haiti, the country’s socioeconomic prognosis 
remains dire.243 With such an outcome, The Bahamas must change the way it has 
conducted the fight against illegal immigration from Haiti. 
Undoubtedly, a marked change in Bahamian policy of “sporadic round-ups and 
deportations” instituted since the late 1950s is desperately needed.244 The policy has 
clearly proven futile, as the Haitian community in The Bahamas continues to grow year 
by year. Costs associated with interdiction, detention, and repatriation are increasing with 
no signs of abatement.  
Last but not least, there is no cause for optimism that things will soon improve in 
Haiti. An aspirant for the presidency of Haiti, Jean H. Charles, candidly makes this point 
in an editorial recently published in a Bahamian local. In the article, Charles suggests that 
                                                 
240.  Bahamas Statement to IMO-High Level Meeting. 
241.  Ibid. 
242.  Craton, Pindling, 362. 
243.  Max Manwaring, Donald E. Schultz, Robert Maguire, Peter Hakim, and Abigail Horn, “The 
Challenges of Haiti’s Future,” Report on conference sponsored by U.S. Army War College, Georgetown 
University, and Inter-American Dialogue, 22 August 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pdffiles/PUB36.pdf.  
244.  Smith, “Bahamian Angst Over Shanty Towns.” 
 57 
the “lack of sound institutions and infrastructure” continue to encourage the nomadic 
activity of Haitians.245  
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14 October 2015, http://www.thenassauguardian.com/opinion/op-ed/59849-haiti--a-nation-in-disarray.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Repetitio est absurdum246 
 
National security in the Bahamian context, like elsewhere, must account for the 
judicious management of scarce resources in order to achieve optimal results in 
protecting the island nation from both internal and external threats. Ad hoc reactions to 
foreseeable problems are unacceptable in the existing threat environment where 
smugglers, potential terrorists, and others seek to take advantage of national security 
weaknesses. It is simply no longer acceptable—even for developing nations like The 
Bahamas—to periodically throw manpower and scare resources at problems in hopes of a 
miraculous outcome. Meanwhile, rising levels of domestic and transnational crimes 
continue to threaten and jeopardize the country’s relatively outstanding tourism-driven 
economy.  
After forty-three years of independence, successive Bahamian governments have 
failed to evolve beyond the colonial model of knee-jerk reactions to security challenges. 
Instead of creating a comprehensive national security strategy, the country has left its 
strategic development to chance. As a result, responses to challenges overall have been 
reactionary and not anticipatory. Even existing challenges, such as the Haitian problem, 
remain without a broad, well thought-out response, beyond apprehension, detention, and 
forced repatriation. Because Haitian immigration and other localized issues do not 
directly impact the United States as does the drug trade, Bahamians will have to 
determine solutions on their own. Perhaps an involved NSC explicitly geared toward 
advising the prime minister can inspire traction beyond the present posture.  
The country must now consider concrete steps toward shaping its security 
complex toward the apprehension of known and unknown threats by creating a 
comprehensive national security strategy that accounts for all possible eventualities. This 
thesis reveals that since the chance discovery of the islands of The Bahamas in 1492 to 
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their attainment of independence in 1973, the Bahamian government’s haphazard 
approach to historical criminality in the country’s vast maritime domain has not changed. 
It asserts that in order to arrest this notable deficiency and better safeguard the county’s 
vital tourism industry, create a safer environment for residents, and bring considered 
focus to the persistent Haitian problem, The Bahamas should operationalize its NSC 
through improved CMR to enable the creation of a holistic national strategic strategy that 
includes the country’s entire security complex.  
Like many former British colonies, The Bahamas inherited strong public 
institutions and established bureaucracies upon independence, but a comprehensive 
national security organization was not among them. Seven years following independence, 
The Bahamas erected the RBDF and fashioned it as much as practicably possible into a 
scaled-down version of the British Royal Navy. The RBDF was charged with 
safeguarding the nation’s porous maritime borders. Despite ensuring that the entity’s 
officers and enlisted personnel are professionally trained to perform their tasks, civilian 
leaders have not sought the necessary qualifications needed to effectively manage a 
military organization. In reality, the lack of strategic vision exhibited by Bahamian 
civilian leaders since independence is a result of a failure to pursue the required training 
for civilian managers in this regard.  
Inadequate institutionalization of The Bahamas’ national security complex has 
invited occasions for opportunistic maritime law-breaking in the islands over the years. 
Even with American help, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and illegal immigration still 
thrive in the country. Apparently underestimating the weight and intricacies of foreign 
affairs and domain security, an untried Bahamian government failed to check an out-of-
control drug trade in the islands in the 1980s and attracted American ire as a result. The 
eventual mending of U.S.–Bahamian partnerships aimed at securing their connecting 
borders signaled collective intolerance to illegality in The Bahamas. Bahamian leaders 
can ill-afford to repeat this mistake. Unchecked security issues will not bode well for the 
county’s thriving tourist industry.  
The present realities of regional geopolitics beg all-around adjustments in The 
Bahamas. Like other former colonies that inherited relatively decent institutions from the 
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British, The Bahamas must now figure out its place in a region no longer dominated by 
the “East-West ideological cloud,” which predominantly shaped their security posture in 
America’s favor.247 In the end, many Caribbean nations continued in the British legacy 
of acquiescence to the United States.248 The end of the Cold War, however, resulted in a 
shift in American policy, which in the 1980s evinced America’s “preeminence in global 
political, economic, and military affairs” as Reagan’s government sought to eradicate any 
vestiges of communism from the region.249 Except for the war on drugs, the United 
States has pretty much left everyone in the region to deal with their own problems.  
Although the nation’s current chief executive, Prime Minister Perry Christie, 
appreciates the need for better employment of the NSC to address the country’s national 
security concerns, no concrete measures have yet materialized to meet the challenges. An 
additional consequence of the deficient civil–military relations is the apparent Bahamian 
inability to resolve the problem of uncontrolled Haitian immigration to the country for 
more than fifty years now.  
Caribbean experts aver that “the Caribbean runs an acute risk of irrelevance” 
should it fail to adapt to a constantly evolving international environment.250 As The 
Bahamas leads the region in other areas, it must now seek to lead in the area of national 
security sector reform. The Haitian problem provides the perfect challenge to 
demonstrate Bahamian will and ability to step—even if only incrementally—outside of 
the shadow of American hegemonic safety and effect change in both the country and the 
wider Caribbean region.  
Since the 1960s, Bahamian security and immigration agencies have sought to 
alleviate the burden of undocumented Haitian laborers and their families to the socio-
economic challenges of The Bahamas. Due to Bahamian appetite for the cheap labor 
Haitians provide and worsening economic and political dispositions in Haiti, the problem 
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has worsened over the years. As it is unlikely that conditions in Haiti will change any 
time soon, Bahamians must consider measures beyond their past initiatives before their 
small population is displaced, as feared by some. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A departure from current Bahamian policies relative to the Haitian problem is 
needed. Instead of merely seeking to apprehend and repatriate illegal Haitian immigrants 
attempting to enter or already in the country, Bahamian policy makers should create a 
far-reaching strategy that includes enforcing existing laws, developing strategic 
initiatives, completing efforts to decentralize RBDF operations, and undertaking strategic 
communication campaigns in Haiti. 
The following recommendations are intended to address the major challenges 
associated with the Haitian problem and are offered for consideration by Bahamian 
policy makers and national security strategists. 
1. Operationalize the NSC  
By more civilian involvement in the management of the country’s national 
security affairs through dedicated CMR, the country might be better positioned to deal 
with the threats it faces. Reconsideration of the country’s national security dilemma 
requires the urgent attention of Bahamian leaders. 
Christie might consider a scaled-down version of the American national security 
complex for his ailing and imperiled national outlook. Bahamian officials must prepare 
their NSC to manage the affairs of national defense, foreign relations, intelligence, and 
law enforcement in order for it to positively effect change of the status quo. To achieve 
this outcome, the NSC must be enabled to create strategy, coordinate policy, and inform 
strategic operations aimed at safeguarding the country’s borders and economic future. 
Such an exertion should include coordination of the essential ministries, 
departments, agencies, and other stakeholders with a view of creating a cohesive and 
wide-reaching national security strategy, capable of implementation that is cognizant of 
the threats to be mitigated. All aspects of national security and defense must be 
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incorporated into a single administrable whole, including the RBDF, Royal Bahamas 
Police Force (RBPF), immigration operatives, intelligence agencies, diplomacy, and 
health and environmental ministries. 
To achieve this end, Bahamian legislators should enact the necessary legislative 
measures and instruments by which parliamentary funding and oversight might be 
achieved. A director of national security affairs should be created to guide the operations 
of the NSC toward desired objectives. Such an individual would be responsible to the 
prime minister and legislators for advising on policy and strategies and the dissemination 
of the same under executive authority.  
Immediate inroads can be made into the ongoing Haitian problem in The 
Bahamas if authorities simply seek to enforce laws already in place. It is recommended 
that the government develop docking facilities at Inagua to accommodate and service 
RBDF craft. This would enable RBDF craft to be stationed at Inagua, which would 
provide better and more consistent coverage of the southern quadrants of The Bahamas. 
This would increase the likelihood of immigrant interdictions in that region. Authorities 
intent on better securing Bahamian borders should consider taking initial steps such as 
enforcing existing laws pertaining to hiring undocumented immigrants, more deliberately 
managing restricted vessels, vigorously enforcing international conventions relative to the 
safety of life at sea, and implementing strategic measures to address Haitian immigration. 
2. Enforce Existing Laws 
Bahamian officials can begin to discourage illegal immigration from Haiti by 
simply enforcing existing laws and by so doing discourage the hiring of undocumented 
immigrants. Authorities should also crack down more willfully on restricted vessels from 
Haiti, and enforce more adherences to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS) relative to unseaworthy Haitian sloops wishing to enter The Bahamas.  
3. Gainful Employment of Illegal Immigrants  
Bahamians of all strata of society have traditionally engaged in the practice of 
hiring illegal Haitian immigrants, who offer a ready source of cheap labor. The country’s 
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Immigration Act, Part VI, section 29(1) prohibits this entrenched custom. The act 
stipulates that only Bahamian citizens, certified permanent residents, or holders of work 
permits are authorized by the Minister of Immigration to engage in gainful 
employment.251 Undocumented Haitian immigrants do not fall within these permissible 
categories of persons entitled to gainful employment in The Bahamas.  
Subsection 3 of section 29 of the act also makes it illegal for any other person, 
“whether on his own behalf or on behalf of another,” to employ undocumented 
immigrants. As such, it is recommended that immigration officials enforce existing laws 
pertaining to the engagement of illegal immigrants in their entirety. Currently, 
immigrants are arrested and repatriated, while those who hire them are left to carry on as 
normal. Enforcing these laws consistently would discourage the accepted custom of 
hiring undocumented Haitian immigrants, despite the illegality of doing so.  
4. Restrict Immigration Vessels  
Haitian sloops—frequently used to smuggle undocumented immigrants from Haiti 
to The Bahamas—are generally defined in Bahamian law as “specified vessels.”252 Such 
vessels have been banned from plying Bahamian territorial waters since 1980. Section 
3(1) of the Immigration (Vessels Restriction) Regulations provides that “no specified 
vessel shall enter The Bahamas from any port in Haiti except at the port of Matthew 
Town, Inagua.”253 As a result, any specified vessel failing to adhere to the regulation is 
subjected to a $500 fine.254 
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Smuggling undocumented immigrants into The Bahamas is a lucrative business 
for Haitian smugglers. It is recommended that the regulation be strictly enforced by 
holding identified smugglers accountable for their exploits. The fine for specified vessels 
should be increased to at least $5,000 for first-time offenders, and the vessel of any 
second-time offender should be confiscated, except in circumstances of force majeure. 
The frequency and gravity of immigrant smuggling from neighboring Haiti demands no 
less. Strict enforcement of the law, coupled with steeper fines, would serve to diminish 
immigrant smuggling.  
5. Enforce SOLAS Convention 
The Bahamas acceded to SOLAS on February 16, 1979.255 Haiti acceded to the 
convention in 1989.256 Contracting states are obliged to establish “uniform principles and 
rules” geared toward “promoting the safety of life at sea.”257 As such, deterring unsafe 
and overcrowded Haitian sloops from leaving Haiti is the responsibility of Haitian 
authorities. Aware of the current enforcement and bureaucratic deficiencies in Haiti, The 
Bahamas should consider offering its assistance to the Haitian government in this regard. 
Haiti is resource challenged and therefore unable to competently execute coastal patrols. 
Offering Bahamian resources and personnel to assist with developing Haitian maritime 
law enforcement personnel and providing maritime platforms from which to operate 
would go a long way toward solving this problem.  
Haitian sloops are ill-prepared to put to sea safely.258 Ultimately, Bahamian 
authorities are also obliged to enforce the convention by seeking to prevent Haitian 
sloops with no navigation aids, lifesaving equipment, or communications apparatus from 
landing at Inagua in hopes of preventing the senseless loss of Haitian lives at sea.  
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Steps should be taken to prevent ill-equipped and unsafe Haitian sloops from 
departing Haiti or entering Bahamian waters in an effort to prevent untold numbers of 
Haitian immigrants from needlessly perishing at sea.  
6. Build Haitian Partnership to Mitigate Illegal Immigration from Haiti  
Only through creative initiatives replete with sound strategic policies and 
partnerships with Haiti will The Bahamas begin to make advancements in truly 
mitigating the Haitian problem. This position is supported by successful U.S.–Bahamian 
agreements, such as the Comprehensive Maritime and OPBAT agreements, developed to 
stem the flow of drugs to the United States via Bahamian territory.  
7. Develop a Comprehensive Maritime Agreement with Haiti 
A comprehensive maritime agreement (CMA) between The Bahamas and Haiti 
akin to the one between The Bahamas and the United States should be pursued. Like The 
Bahamas at the height of the drug war, Haiti lacks materiel and necessary expertise to 
police its maritime domain. The Bahamian–U.S. CMA allows U.S. Coast Guard assets to 
conduct maritime law enforcement patrols in Bahamian territorial waters with RBDF 
personnel on board to facilitate legal boardings of suspected vessels. 
A Bahamian–Haitian CMA would permit RBDF assets to patrol Haitian territorial 
waters with Haitian National Police (HNP) officers on board to authorize boardings of 
other vessels. RBDF instructors can train HNP staff in maritime operations, if necessary. 
Further, confiscated boats suitable for inshore patrol can be turned over to HNP to enable 
the establishment of a maritime presence in Haiti to thwart and discourage dangerous 
immigrant voyages. 
8. Establish Labor Exchange in Haiti  
In the 1950s, companies in The Bahamas recruited Haitian laborers to work in the 
country legally. As a result, Haitian laborers have become a staple of Bahamian society, 
albeit nowadays, illegally. The Bahamian and Haitian governments should consider 
operationalizing a labor exchange regime in Haiti that would give Haitian laborers access  
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to lawful entry into The Bahamas. This would likely lessen the incentive for immigrants 
to try to enter The Bahamas illegally.  
It is recommended that the Bahamian government seek to establish a labor 
exchange in Haiti to allow Haitian workers an avenue for lawful entry into The Bahamas. 
Such a center might be staffed by Bahamian immigration and consular personnel, who 
would ensure applicants are vetted and hold the necessary documentation to fill available 
opportunities in The Bahamas for predetermined jobs and prescribed periods of time.  
9. Decentralize RBDF and Immigration Operations  
More priority should be given to decentralizing the maritime operations of the 
RBDF. Apart from the small contingents of RBDF personnel presently operating in 
Nassau Harbour, Abaco, Bimini, Exuma, Grand Bahama, and Inagua, the central 
operation of the RBDF is at HMBS Coral Harbour Base in New Providence. The Haitian 
problem demands a constant and sustained maritime presence in the southeastern 
Bahamas. 
10. Develop a Forward Operational RBDF Base at Inagua  
As the southernmost island in the archipelago, Inagua is of tremendous 
geostrategic importance to the national security of The Bahamas. This is the case because 
most maritime threats to The Bahamas enter through the southern islands of the country. 
The RBDF maintains a satellite base at Matthew Town, Inagua, which must be urgently 
upgraded to more kinetic operational status. This improvement can be achieved through 
the permanent placement of various classes of RBDF patrol boats, reconnaissance 
aircraft, long-range radar facilities, and requisite operations and technical support staff at 
the base.  
11. Construct Immigrant Detention Facilities at Matthew Town  
At present, most Haitian immigrants intercepted in The Bahamas are transported 
to Nassau, New Providence, for vetting and holding in the immigration detention center 
before being repatriated to Haiti. The construction of a modern immigration facility at 
Matthew Town, Inagua, would eliminate the need to transport immigrants all the way to 
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Nassau for processing and eventual repatriation. Such a facility should be constructed and 
staffed by requisite RBDF security, immigration, ministry of health, consular staff, and 
social services personnel to meet all possible eventualities.  
12. Develop Strategic Communications Campaign 
The government of The Bahamas should initiate a strategic communications 
campaign in Haiti to warn of the potential perils of the voyage from Haiti to The 
Bahamas. The focus of the campaign should be on the many deaths that occur during 
such journeys and the notion that even if lucky enough to land safely in The Bahamas, 
work permits are required to participate in gainful employment, and authorities will 
apprehend, detain, and forcibly return them to Haiti. 
Such a campaign envisions complete coverage of Haiti with the support of the 
Haitian government and relative non-governmental organizations. 
B. EPILOGUE 
There is no silver bullet capable of eliminating the age-old challenge of illegal 
immigration. Simply accepting the status quo relative to unabated Haitian immigration to 
The Bahamas has long been intolerable. The recommendations made in this thesis—
which are by no means exhaustive of potential initiatives and actions that might be taken 
to mitigate the problem—are provided consideration and with a view of changing the 
status quo. As such, they are offered for serious consideration. 
In the present condition, The Bahamas will continue fighting the still unresolved 
and growing Haitian problem in the same manner as has been practiced for the past fifty 
years, and will likely reap the same circular results. Should the recommendations offered 
be accepted, focus will come to the problem and long-term solutions are likely to be 
formed, implemented, and realized. Moreover, Bahamians might begin to directly shape 
their strategic outcomes rather than waiting for uncontrollable events and others to do it 
for them. In any event, repeating the last half century relative to the Haitian problem in 
The Bahamas would be nothing short of absurd.  
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